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Abstract 
We estimate the causal impact of restructuring aid granted by the European Commission 
between 2003 and 2012 on the survival and financial viability of aided firms. Using a 
comprehensive dataset we find that restructuring aid increases a firm’s average survival 
time by 8 to 15 years and decreases the hazard rate by 58 to 68 percent, depending on the 
definition of firm survival. Further analysis finds strong support that, in the longer run, 
aid receiving firms have a significantly higher probability to improve their financial 
viability than the counterfactual group.  
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 Introduction 1
The granting of state aid or subsidies1 is a traditional and important tool of public 
policy. By reallocating funds – on a selective basis – to industries or firms, governments 
on the one hand may aim at compensating for market failures or market imperfections 
thereby improving market allocations and social welfare. However, on the other hand, 
such selective reallocations are not only generally suspected of causing incremental 
societal costs by damaging competition and distorting trade but may also be guided by 
less altruistic alternative governmental motives – such as, for example, the preservation 
of powers – typically associated with detrimental effects on social welfare.2 This 
ambivalence in the motivations – together with increasing political pressures to reduce 
government spending – has led many countries to tie such transfers to the fulfilment of 
strict conditions. 
 For the European Union and its key objective of creating common European markets 
for goods and services, the control of state aid has always been of key interest. However, 
although the 1957 Treaty of Rome already included key provisions on state aid, it took 
until the end of the last century before the European Commission successfully started 
several stages of substantial reforms of the existing rules aiming at ‘less and better 
targeted state aid’ (European Commission, 2005) and ‘good aid that supports growth’ 
(European Commission, 2012).3 The general success of these initiatives – such as the 
2005-2009 State Aid Action Plan and the 2012-2014 State Aid Modernization Reform – 
is reflected not only in the development and implementation of stricter and more 
transparent state aid rules but also in a shrinking significance of (non-crisis related) 
state aid transfers from 1.10 percent of GDP in 1992 to 0.49 percent of GDP (EU-28) in 
2013.  
 However, despite its decreasing share, state aid continues to be an important tool of 
government policy in the European Union reflected in overall (non-crisis related) 
1  As noted by the OECD (2010), there are no substantive differences in the definitions of ‘state aid’ and 
‘subsidies’. In the remainder of this paper, we will use the term ‘state aid’ (referring to the official 
wording of the European Commission).  
2  For detailed overviews of the (efficiency- or equity-related) rationales for granting state aid in general 
and the existence of a European State aid control in particular, see Nitsche and Heidhues (2006) or 
Friederiszick et al. (2007).  
3  See Kassim and Lyons (2013) for a detailed overview of the history of European state aid policy. 
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transfers of about 64.4 billion Euros in 2013.4 While a large fraction of European state 
aid is granted for so-called horizontal objectives covering areas such as environmental 
protection, regional development as well as research and development (including 
innovation), sectoral aid (excluding both agricultural and transport sectors) still 
accounted for about 10 percent of European state aid transfers in 2013. In fact, as part 
of its sectoral aid activities, the European Commission considers rescue and 
restructuring (henceforth R&R) aid as key policy tool to support firms in difficulty 
aiming at avoiding their dissolution with all the expected negative (societal and 
economic) consequences such as loss of employment, technical knowhow and expertise or 
disruption to important services. However, a necessary precondition for the granting of 
R&R aid by the European Commission in a certain case is a sufficiently high likelihood 
that the respective aided firm will return to viability after going through the compulsory 
restructuring process.   
 In this context, we estimate the causal impact of 56 positive restructuring aid 
decisions – reached by the European Commission between 2003 and 2012 – on the 
survival probability and financial viability of aided firms. Based on the construction of a 
non-aid receiving counterfactual group through a matching procedure, our application of 
survival models shows that restructuring aid increases a firm’s average survival time by 
8 to 15 years and decreases the hazard rate by 58 to 68 percent, depending on the 
definition of firm survival. Subsequently, estimating ordered response models, we find 
strong support that, in the longer run, aid receiving firms have a significantly higher 
probability to improve their financial viability than the counterfactual group of non-
aided firms. Our results therefore suggest that the European Commission was not only 
successful in saving a large fraction of the aided firms in difficulty from their dissolution 
but also that its evaluation procedure to grant restructuring aid is effective in the sense 
that aided firms have a significantly larger probability to return to (financial) viability 
than the control group of non-aided firms.  
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we provide 
an overview of the institutional background of R&R aid transfers in the European Union 
and briefly review the existing literature that aims at estimating the impact of R&R aid 
on firm survival and financial viability. The third section continues with the 
4  Sources: 1992 data stem from Tunali and Fidrmuc (2015) while 2013 data were retrieved from the 
European Commission’s State Aid Scoreboard (available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
state_aid/scoreboard/index_en. html (last accessed on 13 February 2016)).  
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presentation of our econometric analysis, subdivided further into a general 
characterization of our identification strategy in Section 3.1, the detailed description of 
our data set in Section 3.2, the matching procedure in Section 3.3 and our main 
empirical results of an application of, first, survival models in Section 3.4 and, second, 
ordered response models in Section 3.5. Selected policy implications of our empirical 
results are discussed in the fourth section, before Section 5 closes the paper with a 
review of its main insights and an identification of avenues for future research.  
 Institutional background and literature review  2
In this section, we first provide a description of state aid in the European Union in 
general and the concept of rescue and restructuring (R&R) aid in particular. 
Subsequently, we review the rather small existing literature which studies the impact of 
R&R aid on the survival and financial viability of aided firms.  
2.1 State aid and rescue and restructuring aid in the European Union 
According to Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), state aid is defined as “… any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods …”. Granting state aid 
is generally prohibited unless it is justified by reasons of general economic development. 
To ensure that this prohibition is respected and exemptions are applied equally across 
the European Union, the European Commission is in charge of ensuring that state aid 
complies with EU rules. 
 Due to the broad and general character of state aid in the European Union, reaching 
the aim of a transparent and strict application procedure requires several regulations 
and different guidelines for different types of aid.5 These different types are also reflected 
in the European state aid statistics which first subdivide state aid expenditures into 
non-crisis aid and crisis aid. Limiting our further discussions to the former category, a 
5  For example, the European Commission’s State Aid Modernization (SAM) reform – launched in 2012 
and completed in 2014 – aimed at providing ‘more efficient decision making and procedures for 
granting growth-supporting aid’ through the reform (or creation, respectively) of both key regulations 
(such as the Procedural Regulation or the General Block Exemption Regulation) and several more 
specific guidelines (such as Broadband, Regional Aid, R&D&I or R&R Guidelines). See European 
Commission (2015, pp. 4ff.) for further information. 
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further subdivision into horizontal objectives aid and sectoral aid is undertaken. 
Horizontal aid includes transfers for regional development, environmental aid, research 
and development (including innovation) and aid for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises. Sectoral aid, however, includes government transfers to agriculture and 
fisheries, transport, coal, steel and shipbuilding as well as R&R aid. Figure 1 below 
provides an overview of the development of the relative significance of the two main 
categories6 over time as well as the absolute amount of government spending for R&R 
aid as part of sectoral aid.    
 
Figure 1: EU State aid and rescue and restructuring aid (2008-2013) 
Data source: EC State Aid Scoreboard 
As shown in the left-hand chart in Figure 1, the total sum of EU State aid peaked in the 
year 2009 with a value of 82.8 billion EUR; however, experienced a substantial 
downward trend in the following years reaching the smallest value of 64.4 billion EUR in 
2013. Interestingly, the share of horizontal objectives aid increased from 64 percent in 
2008 to 74 percent in 2013 leading to corresponding reductions in both agricultural aid 
(from 15 to 13 percent) and transport aid excluding railways (from 4 to 2 percent). 
Sectoral aid in the narrower sense – of which R&R aid is a significant fraction – is also 
found to have followed a decreasing trend from a share of 16 percent in 2008 to 10 
percent in 2013.      
 Turning to the right-hand chart in Figure 1, it is on the one hand revealed that the 
share of R&R aid out of the (narrow-defined) sectoral aid category fluctuates between 5 
percent in 2008 and 9 percent in 2009. In terms of the absolute amount of R&R aid 
granted by the European Commission, the average amount of 693 million EUR for the 
6  For illustrative purposes, agricultural aid and transport aid are reported separately (although 
technically part of sectoral aid). 
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entire time period from 2008 to 2013 is characterized further by a maximum value of 
1,079 million EUR in 2009 and a minimum value of 504 million EUR in 2013. 
 Although rather small in size, R&R aid is an important policy tool for the European 
Commission. By definition, R&R aid can only be granted to firms in difficulty. 
According to the 2004 Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines7 (hereafter referred as 2004 
Guidelines), a firm in difficulty means a firm that “… is unable, whether through its own 
resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its owner/shareholders or creditors, 
to stem losses which, without outside intervention by the public authorities, will almost 
certainly condemn it to going out of business in the short or medium term.” (p. 3, para. 
9 of the 2004 Guidelines). In particular, a firm is regarded as being in difficulty in the 
following circumstances: 
a) “in the case of a limited liability company, where more than half of its registered 
capital has disappeared and more than one quarter of that capital has been lost 
over the preceding 12 months; 
b) in the case of a company where at least some members have unlimited liability for 
the debt of the company, where more than half of its capital as shown in the 
company accounts has disappeared and more than one quarter of that capital has 
been lost over the preceding 12 months; 
c) whatever the type of company concerned, where it fulfils the criteria under its 
domestic law for being the subject of collective insolvency proceedings“ (p. 3, 
para. 10 of the 2004 Guidelines). 
Also according to the 2004 Guidelines, R&R aid may only be regarded as legitimate 
subject to certain conditions. It may be justified namely by social or regional policy 
considerations, by the need to take into account the beneficial role played by small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the economy or, exceptionally, by the desirability of 
maintaining a competitive market structure when the demise of firms could lead to a 
monopoly or to a tight oligopolistic situation. 
 The 2004 Guidelines distinguish between rescue aid and restructuring aid. Rescue aid 
is designed to allow firms that are facing imminent collapse to stay in business for long 
7  Community Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty, Official 
Journal of the European Union (2004/C 244/02). The guidelines were adopted in 1994 and amended in 
1999 and 2004. The current version of the guidelines became effective in 2014 (see Guidelines on State 
Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Non-Financial Undertakings in Difficulty, Official Journal of the 
European Union (2014/C 249/01)).  
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enough to prepare a restructuring plan. It must be in the form of liquidity support 
(loans or guarantees) and has a maximum duration of six months. If further public 
support is needed after that, it must be in the form of restructuring aid. Restructuring 
aid aims at supporting a firm's restructuring and its return to long-term viability. It can 
be granted for a longer period, but must be accompanied by a detailed restructuring 
plan that meets a number of conditions (see p. 12, para. 82 of the 2004 Guidelines). 
 The overall objective of EU policy for restructuring aid to the non-financial sector is 
to contribute to successful restructuring of firms where this can be considered legitimate 
in the light of the justifications explained above. These justifications can only be met by 
firms that are viable. Moreover, the risks for distortive effects need to be minimized 
which implies that the amount of aid given is kept to the minimum necessary to 
implement the plan and appropriate measures are taken to minimize the adverse impact 
on competition.  
 In particular, the 2004 Guidelines therefore require the EC to verify the compatibility 
of restructuring aid according to three principles (p. 2, para. 7 of the 2004 Guidelines). 
First, return to viability, i.e., a restructuring plan must be submitted showing that after 
completing its restructuring, the firm will be able to cover all its costs and to compete in 
the market on its own merits. Second, an own contribution, i.e., the aid recipient must 
make a significant contribution to the costs of the restructuring (up to 50 percent in the 
case of large companies) from its own resources. Third, compensatory measures, i.e., the 
adverse effects of the aid on trading conditions are minimized by divestments of assets, 
reductions in capacity or market presence and reduction of entry barriers to the markets 
concerned.  
2.2 Literature review 
The ex-post evaluation of different types of state aid schemes has long been of interest 
in both academia and practice. In academia, the ex-post evaluation of the impact of, for 
example, R&D public policies on various outcome variables has long been attracting a 
substantial amount of research focusing on both various national levels and cross-
country comparisons (see, e.g., Bronzini and Piselli, 2016, Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 
2012, 2013, Dimos and Pugh, 2016, as well as Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2012, and the 
respective literature cited there). In practice, the European Commission itself 
commissioned studies evaluating the impact of its R&D aid (see CERES, 2005) or its 
regional aid (see Ramboll & Matrix, 2013) schemes and, most recently, implemented a 
6 
compulsory evaluation process for certain categories of aid as part of its State Aid 
Modernization (SAM) reform (see European Commission, 2013, 2015). 
 Guided by our aim to study the particular impact of restructuring aid decisions, two 
general strands of research can be differentiated: first, studies that aim at investigating 
the effectiveness question, i.e., whether restructuring aid policies are found successful in 
avoiding (or delaying) market exit of aided firms. Second, studies focusing on the 
subsequent efficiency question, i.e., whether the respective (potentially effective) 
restructuring aid policies are likely to have promoted social welfare by, first, their direct 
impacts on the aid beneficiaries (including their respective industries or sectors) as well 
as, second, their various (positive or negative) indirect impacts on, e.g., competition, 
trade, employment, investment or economic growth.8 
 Limiting ourselves to a review of the former set of articles, in an early contribution, 
Glowicka (2006) studies the effectiveness of bailouts in preventing bankruptcy. Using a 
data set of 86 R&R aid cases decided by the European Commission between 1995 and 
2003 she compares survival probability between firms that received only rescue aid and 
firms that also received restructuring aid finding that restructuring aid is significantly 
more likely to prevent firm’s market exit than rescue aid. She also finds that the 
estimated hazard rate increases during the first four years after the aid was granted and 
drops after that (suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing 
it). She concludes that a tougher European state aid control would likely increase social 
welfare through a reduction in the number of failing bailouts. 
 The study by Chindooroy et al. (2007) investigates the survival of firms after a 
positive R&R aid decision by the European Commission. Starting from the same data 
8  For qualitative as well as quantitative discussions of the efficiency question, see, e.g., London 
Economics (2004), Oxera (2009), Schweiger (2011) or Tunali and Fidrmuc (2015). Interestingly, the 
European Commission (2013, pp. 35ff.) itself proposes to study the efficiency question by 
differentiating between the positive direct impacts of the granting of R&R aid at the level of the 
beneficiaries as well as positive indirect impacts on broader policy objectives. While the ‘maintenance 
of employment and activity at firm-specific and regional level’ as well as ‘changes in market share and 
productivity of aided firms’ are explicitly mentioned as suitable result indicators for the direct impact, 
the broader category of indirect impacts of granting R&R aid is subdivided further into macroeconomic 
gains, advantages in the diversification of the regional economy, benefits of an increased cooperation 
between private and public enterprises or positive externalities (spill-over effects) of R&R aid on the 
European, national or regional economy. However, the European Commission is also explicit in 
discussing potential negative effects of R&R aid on competition and trade such as a possible sectoral 
bias, a bias towards loss-making (incumbent) firms or firms with low productivity (‘prevention of exit’) 
or a reinforcement of market power. 
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set as Glowicka (2006), the authors exclude nine cases – as the implementations of the 
compulsory restructuring plans were not finished yet – leaving 77 EC R&R aid cases 
between 1995 and 2003 for the empirical analysis. Applying a probit-model to evaluate 
the chances for survival, the authors find that almost 50 percent of the firms having 
received rescue aid did not survive while only 20 percent of the restructuring aid-
receiving firms had to exit the market for good at some point. The mortality rate is also 
found to vary considerably over time. While firms receiving rescue aid show a high 
mortality particularly in the first three years after the aid was granted, restructuring 
aid-receiving firms have a lower mortality and – if they nevertheless had to exit – they 
tend to do so between three and six years after receiving the aid.   
 Last but not least, in a recent contribution, Nulsch (2014) also studies particularly 
the effectiveness of state aid in the European Union. Starting from all R&R aid cases 
available in the European State Aid Register for the period from 2000 to 2010, she 
eventually identified 141 approved R&R aid cases for her econometric analysis. By 
estimating survival rates for aided firms and subsequently comparing the results with 
the survival rates of a subset of comparable non-aid receiving firms, she finds that – 
despite the granting of R&R aid – a firm’s market exit is often only postponed (although 
the ratio is still higher for the non-aided firms). Interestingly, the best survival rates are 
found for firms with long-term restructuring, firms in Eastern Europe as well as smaller 
and more mature firms.    
We contribute to this literature by identifying the causal impact of 56 restructuring 
aid decisions by the European Commission between 2003 and 2012 on firm survival 
through a matching procedure. Additionally, based on the sample of matched non-aid 
receiving firms and aided firms, we estimate duration models in order to predict the 
difference in survival length for aided firms and the counterfactual group of non-aid 
receiving firms. Last but not least, we complement our estimations of the impact of 
restructuring aid on firm survival with an analysis of its impact on the likelihood of a 
firm to recover in terms of financial viability by estimating an ordered logit model. 
 Econometric analysis 3
In this section, we present our econometric analysis of the impact of restructuring aid on 
the survival and financial viability of aided firms. Following a first characterization of 
our identification strategy in Section 3.1, we continue with a detailed description of the 
data set in Section 3.2. Our matching procedure – explained and executed in Section 3.3 
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– provides the basis for an application of, first, both parametric and semi-parametric 
survival models in Section 3.4 and, second, ordered response models aiming at 
investigating the financial viability of the aided firms compared to the counterfactual 
group of non-aided firms in the final Section 3.5.   
3.1 Identification 
In developing our empirical approach we aim at identifying the causal effect of 
restructuring aid on firm survival. Therefore, we have to address a potential selection 
bias since aid is not granted randomly. Although several potentially valuable ex-post 
evaluation techniques exist that generally address the problem of selection bias, a 
meaningful application of either instrumental variable estimation (IV) or selection 
models, a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) or a (conditional) difference-in-
difference estimator (DiD) to our research question – given the available data – faces 
severe methodological problems.  
 For an application of an IV estimator or a selection model, a valid instrument or an 
exclusion restriction, respectively, is required which could not be identified in our case. 
Furthermore, an application of RDD, e.g., with a ‘firms in difficulty’ measure as a 
threshold variable, is unlikely to yield reliable estimates. The reason is that the 
application of the EC’s definition of firms in difficulty (according to the 2004 Guidelines 
on rescue and restructuring aid) is too fuzzy and does not provide a clear cut threshold 
which would be essential for RDD estimations. Finally, a DiD estimator is not 
appropriate in our case as all aid recipients (by definition) have to be alive at the time 
the aid is granted in order to receive meaningful results.    
 We therefore chose an empirical strategy which makes use of matching techniques in 
order to identify the counterfactual group and determine the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT). Subsequently, on the basis of the matched firms we specify duration 
as well as ordered response models in order to deeper investigate the impact of 
restructuring aid on the firm’s survival and financial viability. With respect to the ATT 
our evaluation question can be defined by the subsequent equation 
𝐸𝐸(𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇|𝑆𝑆 = 1) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶|𝑆𝑆 = 1) (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇depicts the outcome variable firm survival while S indicates whether the firm 
has received state aid (1) or not (0). 𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶 is the potential outcome of the treatment group (𝑆𝑆 = 1) if it had not been treated. Because 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶|𝑆𝑆 = 1) is not observed, in contrast to 
𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇|𝑆𝑆 = 1), it has to be estimated. As state aid is not randomly assigned, we cannot 
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simply estimate 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶|𝑆𝑆 = 1) as the average survival of non-aid recipients. Therefore, the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) has to be valid in order to overcome the 
selection problem (see Rubin, 1977). The CIA implies that treatment assignment and 
potential outcome are statistically independent for firms with the same set of exogenous 
characteristics 𝑋𝑋. Matching techniques make use of this concept and enable the 
identification of a counterfactual group of non-treated firms by restricting the relevant 
counterfactual group to firms with the same exogenous characteristics 𝑋𝑋 as the treated 
firms. Then, the remaining difference in the outcome can directly be attributed to the 
treatment if the CIA is valid, which is the case when selection is based on observable 
variables (‘selection on observables’). Thus, formally we can write 
𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶|𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑋𝑋) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶|𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑋𝑋) (2) 
with  
𝐸𝐸(𝑎𝑎𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇|𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) − (𝑌𝑌𝐶𝐶|𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑋𝑋 = 𝑥𝑥) (3) 
denoting the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). 
3.2 Data and variables 
The construction of our data set was conducted in several steps. Before characterizing 
both dependent and independent variables in greater detail in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, it 
is important to identify and characterize the European Commission’s restructuring aid 
cases included into our data set.  
3.2.1 Characterization of restructuring aid cases  
Referring to our categorization of state aid in the European Union introduced above, we 
concentrate on restructuring aid decisions by the European Commission between 2003 
and 2012. Using the European Commission’s online database, we first accessed the entire 
set of decided restructuring aid decisions. Out of this group of cases, we identified all 
positive restructuring decisions for individual firms (not aid schemes such as those that 
exist for SMEs). We exclude decisions in the financial sector as these are subject to 
specific rescue and restructuring rules. Since the 2004 Guidelines are not valid for firms 
in the coal and steel sector either, we exclude these firms from the analysis as well. 
Furthermore, the agricultural sector and the fishery industry – as defined in Section 5 of 
the 2004 Guidelines – as well as cases in which aid was granted to firms in the former 
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German Democratic Republic in connection with the reunification of Germany were also 
excluded due to their status as special types of restructuring aid.   
 In total, our case selection procedure eventually identified 67 firms that received 
restructuring aid and fit to the above criteria. Figure 2 below characterizes the 
respective cases in terms of both their decision year as well as the amounts of aid 
granted.    
  
Figure 2: Restructuring aid cases by year and amount of aid granted (2003-2012) 
Data source: EC restructuring aid decisions 
As shown in the left-hand chart in Figure 1, in general terms, the number of 
restructuring aid cases has experienced an overall growth since 2003, with the last year 
(2012) representing the highest number of decisions taken by the EC. Nevertheless, 
there has been some volatility as shown by declining trends from 2005 to 2006 and 2008 
to 2010. Over the last three years (2010 to 2012), there was consistent growth from 4 to 
13 cases.  
 With respect to the amount of restructuring aid granted, the right-hand chart in 
Figure 2 shows that in almost half of all cases, the firms benefited from an amount of up 
to EUR 5 million, while about 30 percent of the companies were granted aid between 
EUR 5.1 million and EUR 50 million. At the upper end of the spectrum, we find about 
13 percent of the firms receiving an amount between EUR 51 million and EUR 500 
million leaving the remaining about 8 percent for restructuring aid granted above EUR 
500 million.    
 In terms of aided firm size, we find that the majority of about 78 percent of all aided 
firms were large according to the official categorization by the European Commission, 
leaving the remaining 22 percent for medium or small firms. In terms of number of 
employees – as an alternative measure of firm size – about 44 percent of the aided firms 
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have less than 250 employees with about 17 percent of the benefitting companies having 
between 250 and 499 employees thus leaving the remaining about 39 percent for firms 
with a number of employees above 499.    
 Location wise, it is important to note that almost 40 percent of the aided firms have 
their headquarters in Poland, with Italy and France representing an additional almost 
22 percent. The remaining EU Member States generated relatively few or no 
restructuring aid cases (after executing our selection procedure). From the total of 17 
countries represented in our analysis, six countries (Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Malta and Slovakia) only had one company receiving aid during the 
observation period with the same number of countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia and the United Kingdom) having two benefiting 
companies. In addition, five Member States (France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Poland) 
had three or more aided companies 
3.2.2 Dependent variables 
Our main outcome variables are firm survival in general and firm financial viability in 
particular. As there are no unique definitions of either of these two variables, we 
characterize our measurement approaches in greater detail in the following.  
Definition of firm survival 
Although on the surface, firm survival appears to be clearly defined, a closer look reveals 
that especially the treatment of firms that either merged with (or were taken over by) 
another firm or are in liquidation (or under bankruptcy protection) requires a richer set 
of alternative definitions of survival shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Alternative definitions of survival  
 Def. 1a Def. 2a Def. 1b Def. 2b 
Active × × × × 
In Liquidation/Insolvency Procedure/ 
Bankruptcy/Default of Payment/Dormant - × - × 
Merger or Takeover × × - - 
Dissolved - - - - 
Note: Crosses indicate that the respective status is included in the survival definition. 
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In implementing these four definitions of survival, we use the information provided in 
the AMADEUS database9 to first generate a dummy variable that indicates a firm’s 
operating status in 2014 (the final year of our analysis). Firms are considered as being 
alive (i.e., the dummy equals 1) if AMADEUS reports that a firm is either ‘active’ or 
was ‘acquired’ (Definition 1a).  
 However, in applying this definition, firms that are in ‘insolvency proceedings’ and 
firms that were ‘finally dissolved’ are treated equally. This may be a too narrow 
definition of a firm being active since firms can possibly recover after going through 
insolvency proceedings. Hence, we generate an additional dummy variable which 
considers a firm as being alive if AMADEUS reports that this firm is either ‘in 
liquidation’ or ‘bankrupt’10. However, the firm is considered dead if AMADEUS either 
reports it as ‘finally dissolved’ (Definition 2a).  
 Additionally, it might create additional value in the empirical analysis below to 
distinguish between active firms that were target of a successful take-over bid and firms 
that remained legally independent. For this reason, we introduce additional 
classifications of firm survival, based on the two remaining definitions above, as part of 
which we exclude acquired firms from the definition of firm survival. Therefore, 
Definition 1b considers firms as being alive only if AMADEUS reports that a firm is 
‘active’ (and neither ‘acquired’ nor ‘in liquidation’ nor ‘bankrupt’ nor ‘finally dissolved’) 
and Definition 2b counts firms as being alive only if AMADEUS reports that a firm is 
‘active’, ‘in liquidation’ or ‘bankrupt’ (but considers them dead if they were acquired or 
finally dissolved).   
Definition of firm financial viability 
In order to assess a firm’s financial viability we apply the z-score concept of Altman 
(1968, 2002). Altman proposes a multivariate procedure to predict a firm’s probability of 
going bankrupt within two years. This probability can be separated into three 
categories: Low, mid-level and high. We consider firms with a high probability of going 
9  The Amadeus database, provided by Bureau van Dijk, contains comprehensive financial and business 
information on around 21 million companies across Europe. In particular, it includes standardized 
annual accounts, financial ratios, sectoral activities and ownership data. See 
http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/company-information/international-products/amadeus 
for further information (last accessed on 13 February 2016). 
10  Please note that the term ‘bankruptcy’ in this section refers to the AMADEUS definition and does not 
perfectly coincide with our definition of a firm’s market exit in this paper. 
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bankrupt as firms with insufficient financial viability, firms with a mid-level probability 
of going bankrupt as firms with normal financial viability, and firms with a low 
probability of going bankrupt as firms with high financial viability.  
 According to Altman, the probability of going bankrupt can be determined by z-
scores. The calculation of z-scores depends on the legal form of the company. For publicly 
listed firms, z-scores (Z) are calculated by the following equation: Z = 1.2 ∗ X1 + 1.4 ∗ X2 + 3.3 ∗ X3 + 0.999 ∗ X4 + 0.6 ∗ X5 (4) 
𝑋𝑋1 represents the ratio of working capital to total assets, 𝑋𝑋2 is the ratio of retained 
earnings to total assets, 𝑋𝑋3 is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) to total assets, 𝑋𝑋4 represents the ratio of total revenue to total assets and 𝑋𝑋5 is 
the ratio of the market value of equity to total liabilities.  
 With respect to private companies, z-scores are given by the following equation: Z = 0.717 ∗ X1 + 0.847 ∗ X2 + 3.107 ∗ X3 + 0.998 ∗ X4 + 0.42 ∗ X6 (5) 
with 𝑋𝑋6 being the ratio of the book value of equity to total liabilities. Hence, the 
differences between equations (4) and (5) are the weights attached to the five balance 
sheet ratios as well as the different kinds of ratios of equity to total liabilities. While the 
market value of equity is taken into account for publicly listed firms, the book value is 
used for private firms. The final categorization of a firm’s financial viability is shown in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Categorization of a firm’s financial viability according to Altman z-scores 
Category Description Z-Score Range for 
Publicly Listed Firms 
Z-Score Range for Private 
Firms 
1 Insufficient financial viability Z < 1.81 Z < 1.23 
2 Normal financial viability 1.81 < Z < 2.99 1.23 < Z < 2.9 
3 High financial viability Z > 2.99 Z > 2.9 
Source: Altman (1968). 
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In applying Altman’s z-score method11 to our data set, we use information provided by 
AMADEUS12 to determine the legal form of the firms in our sample and to calculate the 
corresponding z-scores following equations (4) and (5) stated above. Specifically, we 
make use of the following balance sheet figures from AMADEUS: 1) Total revenue, 2) 
EBIT, 3) Non-current assets, 4) Current assets, 5) Non-current liabilities, 6) Current 
liabilities, 7) Book value of equity and 8) Other equity. Total assets are calculated as 
the sum of 3) and 4), total liabilities as the sum of 5) and 6), and working capital as the 
difference of 3) and 6). Information regarding retained earnings and the market value of 
equity are not provided by AMADEUS. However, since retained earnings are part of the 
balance sheet figure ‘Other equity’, we use 8) as a proxy for retained earnings. In 
addition, we use the book value of equity for both groups of firms, publicly listed and 
private. Last but not least, we assign all firms in our data set to the above mentioned 
three categories – insufficient, normal or high financial viability – defined by Altman.  
3.2.3 Independent variables 
Turning to the independent variables, we use – in addition to the above mentioned 
variables 1) Total revenue, 5) Non-current liabilities and 6) Current liabilities – the 
following further financial and business information in our econometric analysis (which 
we also obtained from AMADEUS): 9) Net earnings (profits), 10) Liquidity ratio, 11) 
Solvency ratio, 12) Employment level, 13) Year established, 14) Firm size, 15) NACE 
Code, and 16) Country. 
 The liquidity ratio is the ratio of quickly marketable assets (e.g., cash) to non-current 
liabilities. Hence, the financial viability should be positively linked to a higher liquidity 
ratio. The solvency ratio is defined as the ratio of the sum of net earnings and 
depreciation to total liabilities. As with liquidity ratios, high solvency ratios imply a 
higher financial viability. Firm size is categorized by AMADEUS into four types: Small, 
11  Even though Altman’s method to predict bankruptcy is sometimes criticized due to its simplicity in 
general and its failure to consider the general market environment (e.g., local bankruptcy laws) in 
particular, it is still viewed as a reliable (and frequently applied) tool to assess a firm’s financial stress 
condition (see, e.g., Grice and Ingram, 2001). In fact, recent research suggests that the efficacy of the 
Altman z-score in predicting financial distress is high with bankruptcy filings being accurately 
predicted in 94 percent of the cases and financial distress in over 90 percent of the cases (see Hayes et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, the z-score continues to enjoy great popularity in the finance literature and is 
a crucial part of contemporary commercial rating models (e.g. Agrawal 2013, Altman and Hotchkiss, 
2006 or Bemmann, 2005). 
12  As AMADEUS only provides information for the most recent ten years – and also drops firms that 
have exited the market after several years – we also use historical AMADEUS data. 
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medium, large and very large. The NACE Code, which indicates a firm’s main area of 
activity, is obtained on the four-digit level.  
 Additional country-level data is drawn from Eurostat. In particular, we obtain the 
following three variables: 17) Average unemployment rate of the last three years, 18) 
Ratio of subsidies to governmental expenditures, and 19) GDP per capita. These 
variables are measures which might affect the propensity of a national government to 
provide aid to firms. For example, when the economy is in a bad state (i.e., it faces low 
GDP growth and high unemployment), political pressures to grant aid are expected to 
be higher. However, governments with a general tendency (or culture) to support firms 
through transfers – for example, as part of an industrial policy approach – might 
generally be more prone to grant restructuring aid.  
 In sum, by using the name of the aid receiving firms, we were able to identify 63 out 
of 67 restructuring aid receiving firms in AMADEUS and obtained the respective 
financial and business information for the years between 2000 and 2013. The pool of 
possible matching partners forms, together with the observations for the aid receiving 
firms, the sample for the subsequent matching. It includes firms that (a) have its 
company headquarters within the EU-28 and (b) operate in a similar industry (measured 
by the first two digits of the NACE Code) as the aid receiving firms (see Section 3.3 
below).  
 We had to cope with certain challenges in terms of data availability with respect to 
both dependent and independent variables as AMADEUS does not consistently report 
the respective information throughout our time period of interest (2000 to 2014). For 
some firms, there are gaps in the data with respect to specific years or variables. It is 
partly also the case that, in a given year, one or more variables are missing.  
 Due to the large number of possible matching partners, we are less concerned about 
data availability of non-aid receiving firms. However, we aim at avoiding missing values 
with respect to the independent and dependent variables of aid receiving firms in order 
to keep as many aid-receiving firms as possible in our analysis. In particular, the values 
of variables for the years before state aid was granted are of relevance for the 
identification of appropriate matching partners for the aid-receiving firms. As a 
consequence, we imputed a small number of data points with respect to the variables 
used in the matching procedure to avoid severe reductions in the subsample of aid 
receiving firms. A full documentation of the imputed data points can be found in Table 
10 in the Annex. 
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3.3 Matching procedure and Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATT) 
The construction of counterfactuals for treated firms that received restructuring state 
aid will be conducted by matching methods in order to mitigate problems arising from 
selection bias. Matching rests on the following identifying assumptions: i) the selection 
into the treatment group is only driven by observable variables (‘selection on 
observables’) and ii) based on the selection on covariates, selection into treatment is 
random (the ‘conditional independence assumption’ (CIA) discussed above). Matching 
further requires iii) a large enough sample size to ensure that there is an overlap 
(‘common support’) as regards the observables in both groups, treated and untreated 
units, as well as sufficient information on covariates that affect both the treatment 
decision and the outcome. 
 In our case, (i) and (ii) implies that we observe all relevant factors why one firm 
receives aid and another one does not. The analysis can be confounded, e.g., when aided 
firms have systematically better political connections and we do not account for this. 
Then, the measured treatment effect not only captures the effect of aid, but also of this 
unobserved firm characteristic. In practice, this concern might not be particularly 
relevant as it alleges favoritism by the European Commission. Finally, iii) is violated if, 
e.g., all large firms in our data set receive aid. In such a case, there is no common 
support for firm size.  
 When treatment assignment depends on a vector of discrete and continuous 
covariates, the concept of propensity score matching becomes particularly useful. 
Whereas exact matching methods (which require identical values for each variable for 
treatment and control group) suffer from the curse of the dimensionality problem (lack 
of common support), less restrictive matching methods – such as propensity score 
matching (PSM) – reduce this problem by defining a single distance metric based on the 
covariates. Functions of relevant observed covariates are referred to as balancing scores. 
One type of balancing score is the propensity score which measures the conditional 
probability of treatment assignment (see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for an overview).  
 In order to predict the probability of receiving state aid, we estimate a probit model 
with the following list of covariates (using the data sources described above):  
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− Firm level financials: ln Profit; ln Fixed Liabilities; ln Current Liabilities; Revenue 
per Employee; Altman z-score category; Liquidity ratio; Solvency ratio; dummy 
‘Public firm’ indicating whether the firm is listed on the stock exchange  
− Firm level structural characteristics: ln Employment; ln Age; firm size dummies 
(‘Medium Firm’; ‘Large Firm’; ‘Very Large Firm’) 
− Industry level: Industry dummies based on 1-digit NACE industry codes 
− Country level: Dummies for the country where the firm is headquartered 
− Macro level: Unemployment level of the last 3 years; Share of subsidies from 
governmental expenditures; GDP per capita 
Firm level financials include size measures (in logs) as well as financial key ratios, 
productivity and ownership measures. Firm performance in terms of the financial key 
ratios and productivity approximates financial viability. One would expect that the 
higher a firm´s financial viability is the lower is the likelihood that it will receive 
restructuring aid. A firm´s liquidity and solvency ratio directly captures a company´s 
risk of default and hence the probability to receive state aid. Similarly, whether a firm is 
listed on the stock exchange as well as the financial structure in terms of liabilities in 
general reflects the firm´s ability to access capital markets. The way firms have access 
to capital markets might be crucial for the survival of firms in financial distress and 
hence also exerts a potential impact on receiving restructuring aid.  
 Firm level structural characteristics provide different measures of firm size that 
influence the economic and political consequences of firm bankruptcy and hence the 
likelihood of receiving state aid. Firm characteristics such as firm size and the age of a 
company will also likely influence the adjustment process of firms in financial distress 
and hence firm survival. 
 Industry level dummies capture any industry specific heterogeneity such as differences 
in industry growth rates or industry specific risks. Similarly, country level dummies 
capture any institutional and macroeconomic effects that are peculiar to individual EU 
Member States and which are not covered by the other macro level controls. The latter 
control for different income levels, national labor market conditions as well as the 
proneness of national governments to provide public subsidies in general. It appears that 
this group of controls also exerts a potential impact on both, the likelihood to receive 
state aid as well as firm survival. Table 12 in the Annex reports the results of the probit 
regressions.   
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 First, our main probit regression produced a reasonably good model fit (McFadden 
Pseudo-R2 ~ 0.39) indicating a high predictive power of the included covariates. 
Furthermore, due to the large number of Polish bus operators (NACE Code 4939) 
among restructuring aid recipients (7 out of 67), we performed the probit regression 
both with (regression (1)) and without (regression (2)) public Polish bus operators in 
order to ensure the robustness of our empirical analysis. The total number of 
observations used in the probit estimation contains 57 firms comprising the treatment 
group in regression (1) and 53 treated firms in regression (2).13  
 Based on the results of the probit regressions, we can identify the group of 
counterfactual firms for the firms that received restructuring aid (‘treated’ firms). We 
first construct different counterfactual groups starting with the nearest neighbors (NB = 
1). We then extend the counterfactual group to a total number of three neighbors (NB 
= 3) in order to examine whether our estimates are robust towards different 
specifications of neighbors. We apply nearest neighbor matching with replacement 
meaning that each observation of the control group can be matched with more than one 
of the treated observations.  
 To identify the nearest neighbors, we do not solely rely on the estimated propensity 
scores but – in order to avoid ‘bad’ matches where, e.g., a treated observation is 
matched to a completely different industry – also conduct direct matching on the 
following arguments: same 2-digit NACE Codes, firm size (small, medium, large or very 
large as classified in AMADEUS), a binary variable that indicates whether a firm is 
publicly listed, and the year which represents the start date of the restructuring 
measure. This ensures that the nearest neighbor belongs to the same industry category, 
has the same legal form, the same size and that the counterfactual outcome is observed 
in the same year the treated firm received state aid. All steps conducted for the 
matching procedure are summarized in the matching protocol in Table 11 in the Annex. 
 A necessary condition for the validity of the matching procedure refers to the 
common support requirement. In our case, we deleted observations whose propensity 
score is smaller than the minimum and larger than the maximum of the other group (see 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This basic criterion avoids incomparable matches and 
discards one observation from the unrestricted treatment group and two observations for 
13   Three of the four aid receiving firms which we could not identify through AMADEUS were Polish bus 
operators. Thus, we only exclude four out of the seven Polish bus operators in regression (2). 
Furthermore, we lose six further firms in the probit estimations due to insufficient data availability. 
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the restricted treatment group which precludes the four restructuring aid cases of Polish 
bus operators. This ultimately results in a total number of 56 (51) treated firms for the 
subsequent treatment evaluation analysis.  
 Further assessments of the quality of the matching procedure refer to the performance 
measures of the probit model. The Pseudo 𝑅𝑅2 measures the explanatory power of the 
covariates which should be substantially lower after the matching procedure (see Sianesi, 
2004). Indeed, comparing the Pseudo 𝑅𝑅2 in Table 12 (Pseudo 𝑅𝑅2 ~ 0.39) with the 
respective value of the probit regression after matching based on the sample of treated 
units and counterfactuals in Table 13 (Pseudo 𝑅𝑅2 ~ 0.17 for NB = 1 and Pseudo 𝑅𝑅2 ~ 
0.16 for NB = 3) indicates that the systematic differences between both groups 
decreased substantially after controlling for covariates. Similarly, one can compare 
likelihood ratio tests on the joint significance of all covariates in the probit model before 
and after matching (see Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, p. 49). As required, the null 
hypothesis (‘all covariates are jointly insignificant’) is rejected before (p = 0.00) but not 
after matching (p = 0.83 for NB = 1 and p = 0.28 for NB = 3).  
 Finally, we apply ordinary two-sample t-tests to check the balancing properties of our 
matching procedure. The tests examine whether the mean values of the included 
covariates differ statistically significant for treated and untreated groups before and 
after matching (H0: ‘means are equal for both groups’). For obvious reasons, matching is 
designed to ensure that for units with a similar propensity score, the assignment to 
treatment is random and independent of the covariates. This would closely re-establish 
the conditions of a controlled randomized experiment. If this is satisfied then firms with 
the same propensity score must have the same distribution of covariates independently 
of the treatment status. This balancing condition can be tested by the differences in 
means for each covariate.  
 The last column of Table 14 in the Annex reports the result of the mean tests applied 
to the full sample, i.e., before matching is conducted. As expected, almost all means of 
the covariates are significantly different between treated firms (N = 57) and untreated 
firms (N = 1,132,360). In contrast, the last two columns of Table 3 below report the 
mean test applied to the sample generated by the matching (for nearest (NB = 1) and 
three neighbor (NB = 3) matching).  
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Table 3: Mean difference tests after matching 
 Aid 
receiving 
firms 
N = 56 
 
Selected 
control group 
(NB = 1)  
N = 56 
 Selected  
control group  
(NB = 3) 
N = 168 
 t-tests on 
mean 
differences 
Variables Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.  NB=1 NB=3 
Financial Figures 
ln Profit -3.69 7.27   -2.50 8.11  -3.20 7.26  - - 
ln Fixed liabilities 7.60 4.12   7.24 4.89  7.61 4.22  - - 
ln Current liabilities 9.95 2.71   10.12 2.82  9.90 2.46  - - 
Revenue per employee 153.89  218.74    184.85 187.04  211.72 275.24  - - 
Altman Z-Score category 1.36 0.59   1.39 0.65  1.49 0.71  - - 
Public firm 0.66 0.48   0.66 0.48  0.66 0.47  - - 
Liquidity ratio 0.68 0.65   0.62 0.41  0.90 2.57  - - 
Solvency ratio 9.53 36.39   15.19 30.41  14.26 28.24  - - 
Firm Characteristics                 
ln Employment 6.09 1.77   5.92 2.32  5.75 2.00  - - 
ln Age 3.05 1.14  2.67 0.91  2.88 0.93  * - 
Medium firm 0.30 0.46   0.30 0.46  0.30 0.46  - - 
Large firm 0.29 0.46   0.29 0.46  0.29 0.45  - - 
Very large firm 0.34 0.48   0.34 0.48  0.34 0.47  - - 
Macro level Information                 
Unemploy. last 3 years 9.64 4.25  9.78 4.02  9.40 3.34  - - 
% subs. from gov. exp. 62.67 11.22  63.97 8.29  64.48 8.65  - - 
GDP per capita 2.16 2.50  2.01 2.37  1.64 2.59     -     - 
Outcome            
Stat. 2014 Def. 1a 0.82 0.39  0.68 0.47  0.67 0.47    *   ** 
Status 2014 Def. 2a 0.88 0.33  0.73 0.45  0.73 0.44    *   ** 
Status 2014 Def. 1b 0.80 0.40  0.63 0.49  0.62 0.49   **  *** 
Status 2014 Def. 2b 0.86 0.35  0.68 0.47  0.68 0.47   **  *** 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. H0: equal means for both groups. 
As the nearest neighbor matching procedure is performed with replacement, we also impose 
Lechner´s variance approximation (Lechner, 2001) on the outcome variables. 
 
As shown in Table 3, only for one of all covariates (log of firm age), there is a (weakly) 
significant difference between the selected control group and aid receiving firms (as 
indicated by one star in the NB = 1 column). Therefore, and in line with the above 
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tests, we are confident that our matching procedure was successful in identifying valid 
counterfactuals for the group of treated (i.e., restructuring aid receiving) firms. 
 The outcome variable is the variable of interest in determining the treatment effect. 
As explained above and illustrated in the bottom of Table 3 we analyze four different 
outcome variables. The outcome variable (firm survival) is equal to 1 if AMADEUS 
reports that the status of a firm in 2014 is ‘active’ or ‘acquired’ (Definition 1a), ‘active’, 
‘acquired’, ‘in liquidation’ or ‘bankruptcy’ (Definition 2a), ‘active’ (Definition 1b) or 
‘active’, ‘in liquidation’ or ‘bankruptcy’ (Definition 2b). Hence, in Definition 2a, only 
firms are defined as having exited the market if their status is ‘dissolved’. The 
justification for this definition of outcome is that full recovery is possible for firms with 
status ‘in liquidation’ or ‘bankruptcy’ and such firms can even receive state aid under 
certain conditions. Furthermore, the outcome Definitions (.)a differ from their 
Definitions (.)b counterparts in the sense that they consider acquired firms as having 
exited the market. The motivation behind this differentiation is that it may depend on 
the ultimate aim of granting restructuring aid whether an acquisition of a restructured 
(aided) firm is evaluated as a success of the measure or not.  
 The parameter of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), 
where the mean average outcome of the untreated group – identified through the 
matching procedure – defines the relevant counterfactual for the outcome of the treated 
group (see equation 3 above). The lower part of Table 3 reports the outcome values for 
aid receiving firms (column 2) and different control groups with one (column 3) and 
three (column 4) nearest neighbor(s). One can infer that treatment in terms of receiving 
state aid exerted a significantly positive impact which is robust to the choice of 
definition of the outcome variable (Definitions 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b) suggesting that 
restructuring aid measures significantly increase the survival probability and reduce the 
probability of a firm’s market exit, respectively. 
 For instance, the absolute difference in the probability of a firm to survive until at 
least 2014 is 0.82 – 0.68 = 0.14 if we compare the outcome according to Definition 1a of 
the treated firms with the counterfactual group with one nearest neighbor. This means 
that whilst 82 percent of aided firms were active in the year 2014, only 68 percent of the 
matched non-aided firm were active, implying a difference of 14 percentage points with 
respect to firms’ operating status. As noted above, the difference of 14 percent, however, 
is the absolute difference meaning that from 100 firms 14 firms survive due to 
restructuring aid which otherwise had exited the market. In relative terms, the 
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interpretation is that the average survival probability increases by 21 percent when a 
firm receives restructuring aid (0.14/0.68).  
 An alternative interpretation looks at the probability of a failure which is 1 minus the 
survival probability. Thus, aid recipients will exit the market with a probability of 18 
percent and non-aid receiving firms with 32 percent probability. In other words, 
receiving restructuring aid decreases the average risk of a failure by 44 percent (1-
0.18/0.32) or, alternatively expressed, a non-aid receiving firm from the counterfactual 
group has 78 percent (0.14/0.18) higher relative risk of failure than an aid recipient. 
 The differences in average outcome variables of the treated firms is statistically 
significant according to two-sided t-tests (column 5) throughout all definitions and for 
both, the counterfactual groups with one and with three nearest neighbors, while there 
was no significant difference before in the full sample (see Table 3). Comparing the 
results for the different outcome definitions, we find the largest value for Definition 2b, 
the outcome definition which considers acquisitions as market exits. In other words, aid 
receiving firms are less frequently acquired compared to non-aid receiving firms. Table 4 
below exemplary provides the respective calculations for the nearest neighbor (NB = 1). 
 
Table 4: Differences in survival probability and failure risk (NB = 1) 
 a b c=a/b d=1-b e=a/d 
 Absolute 
difference 
Survival prob. 
for non-aid 
recipients 
Aid increases 
survival prob. 
by: 
Failure risk for 
non-aid 
recipients 
Aid reduces 
failure risk by: 
Def. 1a 14% 68% 21% 32% 44% 
Def. 2a 15% 73% 21% 27% 55% 
Def. 1b 17% 63% 27% 37% 46% 
Def. 2b 18% 68% 26% 32% 56% 
 
Limiting our discussion of the results to the very right of Table 4, it is shown that 
restructuring aid reduces the failure risk by between 44 and 56 percent. Also, the 
different definitions of survival reveal that the probability of being taken over is lower 
for aid recipients as is the probability to be in liquidation or under bankruptcy 
protection. 
3.4 Estimating the impact of state aid on firm survival  
In this section, we continue investigating this relationship by using survival analysis. 
Survival analysis – also referred to as ‘time to event’ analysis or more generally duration 
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analysis – provides a alternative perspective on our subject of study. These methods 
represent a common tool to analyze the time until the occurrence of an event and are 
frequently applied not only in economics but also in a variety of other research 
disciplines such as pharmaceutical statistics (e.g., to assess the efficacy of a new therapy 
in a clinical trial) or engineering (e.g., to study the lifetime of machine components).  
 In our application, the event is the market exit of firms. There are two main concepts 
in the field of survival analysis. The first is the survivor function which is used to 
determine the probability of an individual to survive beyond a certain point in time (i.e., 
a firm is still active after a specific time period). The second concept is the hazard rate 
or hazard function which is the probability that an individual will experience the event 
while that individual is at risk for having an event( i.e., the probability that a firm will 
exit the market in t and it was operating in t-1).  
 Survival analysis enables us to effectively consider right censoring. Right-censoring 
means that some individuals do not experience the event until the end of the 
observation period (see Allison 2010, pp. 413ff.). In our case, firms are said to be right-
censored if they do not exit the market until the last year of our observation period (i.e., 
2014), but potentially will do so afterwards. To adequately consider right-censoring the 
dependent variable in survival analysis has two components: 1) the time to event and 2) 
the event status, which records if the event of interest occurred during the observed time 
period or not.  
 The aim of our survival analysis is to estimate and compare survival functions and 
hazard rates, respectively, of treated and matched control firms in our data set. Using 
survival analysis in this section, we aim at answering the question how the granting of 
restructuring aid affects the overall survival time of firms. Survival analysis can be 
either conducted non-parametrically, parametrically or semi-parametrically with all 
approaches having their specific advantages and drawbacks. In the following, we limit 
the discussion of our estimation results to the parametric (Section 3.4.1) and semi-
parametric (Section 3.4.2) duration methods (since we are also interested in studying the 
impact of covariates on survival).14  
14  The results of an application of non-parametric survival methods, i.e., Kaplan-Meier and Nelson-Aalen 
estimates, are available from the authors upon request. 
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3.4.1 Parametric analysis 
Generally, parametric survival models enable us to control for co-factors with potential 
impact on survival probability. More importantly, they also allow to estimate the 
baseline hazard from which we can predict the average survival time of a firm with 
certain characteristics. Having chosen the appropriate model, parametric survival models 
deliver the highest efficiency compared to either non-parametric or semi-parametric 
methods. As a drawback, the accuracy of parametric survival models depends on the 
distributional assumptions with regard to the survival time (most common are 
exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, loglogistic and lognormal distributions). Parametric 
survival methods are implemented in a regression framework and estimated by 
maximum likelihood. Regression analysis steps involve i) the identification of the 
distribution that best fits the underlying data and ii) the identification of relevant 
covariates.  
 With respect to the first step – finding the optimal distribution – we ran parametric 
regressions with several distributions and computed the corresponding information 
criteria. The model with the lowest information criteria provides the best model fit. In 
our case, as shown in Table 15 in the Annex, the Akaike Information Criterion and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion are lowest for the lognormal model while the exponential 
model fits the data worst. This finding is independent of the definition of outcome and 
the inclusion of covariates. Thus, in the second step, the parametric regressions are 
conducted using a lognormal model of the form  ln(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝜷𝜷𝒙𝒙 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 represents the survival time of firm 𝑖𝑖, 𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊 is a vector of firm specific 
characteristics and  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is an error term which follows a normal distribution with mean 0 
and a standard deviation of 𝜎𝜎. This specification implies the survivor function  
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡) = 1 −Φ�ln(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖)−(𝛽𝛽0+𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝜷𝜷𝒙𝒙)
𝜎𝜎
� , where Φ(. ) is the cumulative distribution function for 
the standard normal distribution.  
 Besides the treatment variable ‘aid’, we also let the survival time depend on 
additional covariates such as macro-level information as well as firm age and dummies 
for public firm and firm size (dummies for Medium Firm, Large Firm and Very Large 
Firm with Small Firms being the reference category). Thus, we can also investigate 
which factors may have an impact on survival probability and length, respectively. 
However, excluding those does not substantially change the results with respect to the 
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‘aid’ variable as – due to the matching procedure – both groups do not differ with 
regard to the control variables. 
 The corresponding estimation results are reported in Table 5 below. It is important to 
note that parametric survival models with a log-normal distribution are parametrized in 
accelerated failure time (AFT) metric, i.e., the coefficients measure to what extent the 
treatment accelerates or decelerates a firm’s survival time – with the underlying 
assumption being that a firm’s survival time is generally limited. In Table 5, we report 
the exponentiated coefficients from our estimates to make them interpretable as time 
ratios. This means they represent the factor by which the (expected) survival time is 
multiplied after a one-unit increase of the explanatory variable. Thus, a time ratio of 
1.68 for ‘aid’ as estimated in Definition 1a can be interpreted as follows: restructuring 
aid prolongs the survival time by 68 percent (1.68-1=0.68) in comparison to the control 
group and approximately doubles survival time if we consider Definition 2a (107 percent 
lifetime expansion), respectively. For the models which consider acquisitions as market 
exit, we also find that public firms have a significantly longer survival time than private 
firms. The corresponding graphical illustrations of the survival functions computed with 
the means of the covariates from Table 5 are shown in Figure 3 in the Annex.   
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Table 5: Parametric survival function based on log-normal distribution (NB = 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Def. 1a Def. 2a Def. 1b Def. 2b 
Aid 1.68*** 2.07** 1.70*** 2.08*** 
 (0.33) (0.74) (0.33) (0.53) 
Public Firm 1.29* 1.31 1.29* 1.30 
 (0.20) (0.28) (0.19) (0.24) 
Age 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Medium Firm 1.10 1.08 1.09 1.07 
 (0.37) (0.59) (0.29) (0.56) 
Large Firm 0.95 1.00 0.95 1.00 
 (0.32) (0.56) (0.26) (0.53) 
Very Large Firm 1.57 1.43 1.50 1.37 
 (0.53) (0.80) (0.42) (0.72) 
Share of subsidies from gov. expenditures (%) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP per Capita 1.03 1.05* 1.03 1.05* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Unemployment level last 3 years 1.04* 1.05 1.04* 1.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Intercept 4.52** 5.40** 4.58** 5.47** 
 (3.04) (4.41) (3.00) (4.35) 
ln_sig -0.19** -0.06** -0.22*** -0.09 
 (0.83) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Sigma 0.83 0.95 0.80 -0.92 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.81) (0.08) 
N 1,438 1,464 1,406 1,432 
Note: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients 
are parametrized in accelerated failure time metric (AFT) and reported as Time Ratios (exponentiated 
coefficients). 
 
As mentioned above, parametric survival models have the advantage that the 
intercept term is also explicitly estimated and defines the baseline survival time which 
enables the prediction of a firm’s survival time conditional on covariates in general and 
the reception of aid in particular. Table 6 shows the respective results for all four 
definitions of a firm’s survival. 
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Table 6: Average survival time 
 Def. 1a Def. 2a Def. 1b Def. 2b 
Predicted average survival duration for aid=0 (years) 11.59 14.12 11.09 13.43 
Predicted average survival duration for aid=1 (years) 19.53 29.20 18.86 27.96 
Difference in average survival duration (years) 7.93** 15.09** 7.78** 14.53** 
 
Table 6 reveals that the average time-to-failure (or survival time) is roughly between 11 
and 14 years for the non-aid counterfactual. For the aid recipients, it is approximately 
twice as high with average times-to-failure between 20 and 29 years, depending on the 
specification of our survival variable. 
3.4.2 Semi-parametric analysis 
In this section, we complete our estimations of duration models with an application of 
Cox proportional hazard models. Cox models (see Cox, 1972) are semi-parametric as 
they leave the baseline hazard function ℎ0(𝑡𝑡) unspecified meaning that they do not 
impose restrictions on the shape of the baseline hazard and therefore allow the baseline 
hazard to be as flexible as possible (however, at the cost of not explicitly estimating the 
baseline hazard). Thus, this class of models does not allow making any predictions on 
survival time. The covariates, however, enter the model parametrically: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(ℎ𝑡𝑡) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (ℎ0(𝑡𝑡)) + 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 (6) 
or equivalently 
ℎ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡𝑡)  ·  𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑒𝑒 (𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘) (7) 
There is no constant term in the linear predictor 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  as the constant 
is absorbed in the baseline hazard ℎ0(𝑡𝑡) which gives the hazard (or the occurrence) of an 
event in t if all other predictors are equal to zero. Thus, Cox models enable us to 
produce covariate-adjusted hazard ratios without imposing any assumption on the 
baseline hazard which yields generally more robust estimates compared to parametric 
analysis. In terms of interpretation, it is important to note that in contrast to the AFT 
metric from the log-normal parametric survival model, we report the coefficients in the 
Cox model as Hazard Ratios (HR), i.e., the ratio of a hazard rate with a one-unit 
increase of an explanatory variable and a hazard rate without such an increase. Hence, 
the HR represents the factor by which the hazard rate is multiplied as a result of a one-
unit increase of an explanatory variable. With respect to our evaluation question, the 
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HR is the ratio of the probability of an event (in our case market exit) in the treatment 
group (i.e., aid recipients) to the control group (i.e., matched non-aid receiving firms) at 
any duration. Thus, the hazard ratio does not depend on the time survived in the 
proportional hazard model, i.e. the hazard ratio is constant over time. If this condition 
holds, the parameters can be estimated without consideration of the baseline hazard 
function. In our case, the proportional hazard assumption cannot be rejected as 
indicated by the test statistics presented in Table 7 below.15  
 Table 7 also reports the results for a Cox model with covariates, applied to the 
dataset with three neighbor matching and all four definitions of survival. We include a 
dummy for public firm, dummies for firm size (medium to very large), a firm’s age as 
well as the macro-level variables unemployment level in the last 3 years, share of 
subsidies from government expenditures (%) and GDP per capita. We report hazard 
ratios (exponentiated coefficients) rather than the actual coefficients in Table 7 since 
their interpretation is more straightforward.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15  The conducted tests are based on the scaled Schoenefeld residuals from the Cox models. If the test 
would reject the null hypothesis of proportional hazards one would interact the covariates with time or 
alternatively divide the data into strata. Since our dataset is discrete in time (calendar years), we 
apply the Efron method to handle tied failures. 
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Table 7: Cox regressions with covariates (NB = 3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Def. 1a Def. 2a Def. 1b Def. 2b 
Aid 0.416** 0.326*** 0.398*** 0.315*** 
 (0.160) (0.155) (0.153) (0.150) 
Public Firm 0.710 0.687 0.712 0.691 
 (0.220) (0.241) (0.219) (0.241) 
Age 0.997 0.997 0.996 0.996 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Medium Firm 0.647 0.696 0.658 0.700 
 (0.312) (0.370) (0.317) (0.372) 
Large Firm 0.850 0.714 0.846 0.710 
 (0.415) (0.395) (0.412) (0.392) 
Very Large Firm 0.366* 0.495 0.388* 0.526 
 (0.188) (0.276) (0.198) (0.291) 
Share of subsidies from gov. expenditures (%) 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.003 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
GDP per Capita 0.934 0.918* 0.936 0.919* 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) 
Unemployment level last 3 years 0.934 0.954 0.934 0.954 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.044) (0.049) 
Test of prop. hazard assump.  p> χ2 for all cov..         
LR χ2 20.54 16.53 20.66 16.86 
p> χ2 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 
# subjects 224 224 224 224 
# observations 1,436 1,462 1,404 1,430 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses (1,000 repetitions). Coefficients are exponentiated and to be interpreted as hazard 
ratios. 
As revealed by Table 7, we find that restructuring aid significantly reduces the hazard 
regardless of the outcome definition. The hazard rate for those firms who received aid is 
only between 32 percent and 42 percent of the hazard rate for those firms that had not 
received the aid, or alternatively expressed, restructuring aid reduces the hazard rate 
between 58 percent and 68 percent – other things equal – which is measurably higher 
than our initial findings from the matching where we found restructuring aid to reduce 
the risk of a failure by 44 percent to 56 percent. In contrast to the findings from the 
parametric survival models, we do not find that a public firm has a statistically 
significant lower risk of a failure, however, the ‘very large firm’ coefficient is significant 
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for Definitions 1a and 1b indicating that these firms also have a lower failure risk if 
‘bankruptcy’ and ‘in insolvency procedure’ are not considered as market exit. 
3.5 Estimating the impact of state aid on financial viability  
Although the analysis of survival rates certainly provides useful insights on the impact 
of restructuring aid on the aided firms, it is a relatively general measure in the sense 
that a firm on the verge to bankruptcy – but still alive – is treated equally to a firm 
that prospered again. In this section, we therefore aim at introducing a financial 
performance indicator in the form of the Altman z-score, i.e., we now additionally 
consider the development of aid receiving and non-aid receiving firms’ financial situation 
over time. Whereas the outcome variable corresponded to the binary categorization in 
Definitions 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, this section employs a multinomial categorization of the 
dependent variable based on the Altman-z score as characterized in Section 3.2.2 above.  
 Although the Altman z-score is a continuous variable (which can be negative and 
take the value of zero), we construct the ordinal scale from Z-score categories as 
described in the data section above – suggested by Altman (1968, 2002) – in order to 
enable a reasonable consideration of market exit within this framework. We start this 
section with a descriptive overview of the Altman z-score differences between aid 
receiving and non-aid receiving firms over time as well as the general data availability 
required for the computation of z-scores followed by the estimation of ordered response 
regression models. 
3.5.1 Descriptive information on Altman z-scores 
Aiming at providing an initial descriptive overview of Altman z-scores, Table 8 below 
presents – for Definition 1a and three nearest neighbors (NB = 3)16 – an overview of 
data availability of the dependent variables in the post-treatment period and also 
provides initial insights into the trend of financial viability of aid receiving firms in 
comparison to their matched non-aid receiving counterparts. In case of a firm’s 
bankruptcy or acquisition, respectively, we consider its market exit to take place one 
year after the last annual financial report is available in AMADEUS. As this procedure 
is conducted for both, aid receiving and non-aid receiving firms, it does not bias our 
results. 
16  The results for the remaining three definitions of survival are provided in Tables 16 to 18 in the 
Annex. 
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Table 8: Mean value of Altman z-scores per year, Def. 1a, NB=3 
     Number of firms from 𝑁𝑁  Number of firms from 𝐴𝐴 
Time 
Cat Year 
𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� P-val. 
in  𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� died acq miss total  in  𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� died acq miss total 
1 0 1.49 1.36 0.1544 168 0 0 0 168  56 0 0 0 56 
                 1 1.52 1.36 0.1254 154 11 0 3 168  50 0 0 6 56 
2 2 1.59 1.47 0.2561 143 18 1 6 168  49 1 0 6 56 
 3 1.62 1.48 0.2682 116 25 2 16 159  42 3 0 8 53 
                 4 1.68 1.47 0.1395 94 27 3 5 129  36 4 0 3 43 
3 5 1.65 1.63 0.8836 77 27 5 5 114  32 3 0 3 38 
 6 1.51 1.63 0.5580 51 30 5 7 93  24 2 0 5 31 
                 7 1.67 1.70 0.8774 39 27 6 6 78  20 4 0 2 26 
4 8 1.75 1.58 0.5692 20 26 5 9 60  12 2 0 6 20 
9 1.83 2.14 0.4721 12 24 5 7 48  7 3 0 6 16 
 10 2.20 2.38 0.6550 5 23 5 6 39  8 2 0 3 13 
 
In Table 8, the column Year shows the number of years that have elapsed since 
restructuring aid was granted to an aid receiving firm or, in case of a non-aid receiving 
firm, to the matched partner in the treatment group. The columns 𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� and 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� show the 
mean value of the Altman z-score category of the non-aid receiving (𝑁𝑁) and aid receiving 
(𝐴𝐴) firms, respectively. P-values refer to a two tailed t-test with assumed unequal 
variances, where the null hypothesis states that 𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� = 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴���. Separated by treatment status 
(i.e., non-aid receiving (𝑁𝑁) and aid receiving (𝐴𝐴)), the subsequent columns display the 
number of firms that (i) are included in the calculation of the mean value of the Altman 
z-scores (in 𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� and in 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� ), (ii) have the status ‘not active’ (died), (iii) were acquired 
(acq), (iv) have the status ‘active’ and were not acquired but do not have enough 
financial variables to calculate a z-score (miss) and (v) are in the sample (total).17 
 As Table 8 reveals, data availability of z-scores depends largely on the considered 
time horizon. We have a higher number of observations for the first years after 
restructuring aid was granted, which decreases in later years. This has implications for 
the following time-dependent multinomial outcome analysis of the effect of restructuring 
aid on the financial viability of firms (which requires a high degree of data availability 
for the different time periods). Therefore, to increase the number of observations in each 
17  Mean values of Altman z-scores can only be calculated for firms that are active, not acquired and 
provide all relevant financial variables to calculate a z-score. Therefore, columns (i) to (iv) add up to 
(v). 
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time period, we cluster the observations of our sample into four time dependent 
categories, as shown in the column Time Cat. It is important to note that, in these 
tables, we did not drop observations for the years after a firm has exited the market or 
was acquired. Hence, the number of firms in the sample decreases over time solely due 
to right censoring, i.e., reaching the end of our observation period in the year 2014. The 
reason is that we can still use the information that a firm has exited the market in one 
particular period in the subsequent periods and we do not lose information for these 
firms.  
 However, while the start year of granting aid varies over time in the sample, the final 
year of our analysis is fixed to 2014 – which implies that we observe less firms over a 
longer time period. Additionally, this is also the reason why the number of firms with 
status ‘not active’ is not monotonically increasing. For instance, a firm that received aid 
in 2008 and had to exit the market in 2010 is only listed as ‘not active’ for the years 2 
to 5. In year 6, the firm drops out of the sample – as the end of our observation period 
is reached – lowering the number of non-active firms due to right-censoring. The same is 
true for the number of firms that were acquired. 
 Table 8 also indicates a positive trend of financial viability for both groups of firms (if 
a company has survived). However, while 𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� is slightly higher than 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� before 
restructuring aid was granted, the aid receiving firms 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� (those which have survived) get 
ahead of those of 𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� (which have survived) after 5 years on average; then they are 
always higher but the difference between 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴���  and 𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛��� never gets significant. However, 
there is a potential reason for this finding: From the previous estimations we know that 
non-aid receiving firms have a statistically significant lower survival probability. Because 
firms with low financial viability are apparently more likely to exit the market, putting 
the focus only on the Altman z-score categories per year without considering market 
exits would positively bias the financial viability measures in favor of the non-aid 
receiving firms.  
 This can be shown by the following example. Let us assume we have two aided firms, 
one with a good financial viability, one with a bad financial viability and also two non-
aided firms, one with good and one with bad financial viability. If the aided firm with 
bad viability survives until time t because of the aid and the non-aided with bad 
viability dies prior to t, only looking at the Altman z-score categories would indicate 
that aid-receiving firms are more likely to be in a bad financial situation after three 
years. Thus, one has to take a look at both at the same time – surviving rates and 
Altman z-score categories per year – to get a full picture. 
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3.5.2 Ordered response  
In the following we classify the dependent variable into three distinct outcomes which 
follow a natural ordering. Therefore, with regard to the bias before discussed, we re-
classify the outcome variable and construct a separate category for firms that have 
exited the market. Furthermore, we group Altman categories 2 and 3 (‘normal financial 
viability’ and ‘high financial viability’) to one single category called ‘save zone’ in order 
to avoid a lack of observations the longer the period under review. This categorization 
enables us not only to analyze whether the probability of exiting the market differs 
between aid receiving and non-aid receiving firms but also whether full recovery is more 
likely for aid receiving firms or not. To summarize, the categories determining the 
outcome variable in the multinomial logit are as follows:  
− Category 1: The firm has exited the market (Definitions 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b, 
respectively). 
− Category 2: The firm is in the ‘red zone’ which is the Altman z-score category 
‘insufficient financial viability’. This is also the baseline category. 
− Category 3: The firm is in the ‘save zone’ which encompasses the Altman z-score 
categories ‘normal financial viability’ and ‘high financial viability’. 
With three outcome categories, the ordered logit model estimates a set of coefficient 
vectors 𝛽𝛽1, 𝛽𝛽2 and 𝛽𝛽3 corresponding to the respective outcome category. Following our 
brief discussion of non-feasible estimation methods in Section 3.1 above, it is difficult to 
interpret coefficients of interaction terms in discrete choice models (as required for the 
classical difference-in-difference estimator; see Greene, 2010). However, recall that after 
conducting the matching procedure, no significant difference in Altman-z score 
categories between treatment group and control group (before treatment) was received. 
Accordingly, the ordered logit approach may be interpreted as a conditional difference-
in-difference approach. 
 Thus, the estimates from the ordered logistic models allow for an attractive way to 
work around the problem of the interaction terms in discrete-choice models by deriving 
marginal effects from the estimated results. Marginal effects refer to the effect of a unit 
increase in the explanatory variable on the probability of selecting the respective 
outcome category expressed in percentage terms. With a dichotomous explanatory 
variable (restructuring state aid is received or not), the marginal effect of receiving aid is 
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the difference in the adjusted predictions for the two groups of firms, i.e., for treated and 
non-treated firms.  
 In order to examine the dynamics of firm survival, we estimate the ordered logit 
model for different time intervals of our period of analysis. In other words, for each of 
our three Altman z-score categories – dead, red zone and save zone – and for each time 
interval, we estimate the probability for both groups to be in the respective Altman z-
score category and subsequently calculate whether the difference in the probability of 
being in the same category differs statistically significant between aid recipients and the 
counterfactual group. 
 Table 9 below reports the ordered logit estimation results for the alternatives 
definitions of firm survival, i.e., Definitions 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b, respectively. The row 
‘Margins’ reflects the difference in the adjusted predictions of both groups of firms while 
‘Av. Pr.’ is the average probability for an aid receiving and a non-aid receiving firm, 
respectively, to be in the respective category.  
Table 9: Ordered logit estimates for different definitions of survival (NB = 3) 
Definition 1a  
Year 0 1-3 4-6 >6 
Z-Cat. 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Av. Pr. No Aid - 0.63 0.37 0.14 0.50 0.35 0.25 0.42 0.32 0.46 0.25 0.29 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Av. Pr. Aid - 0.70 0.30 0.13 0.48 0.39 0.18 0.40 0.42 0.30 0.25 0.45 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) 
Margin  0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.10* -0.16* 0.00 0.16* 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.09) (0.01) (0.10) 
N  224 224 221 221 221 163 163 163 92 92 92 
Definition 1b 
Year 0 1-3 4-6 >6 
Z-Cat. 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Av. Pr. No Aid - 0.63 0.37 0.16 0.50 0.34 0.29 0.42 0.30 0.52 0.22 0.26 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
Av. Pr. Aid - 0.70 0.30 0.13 0.48 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.43 0.31 0.23 0.46 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) 
Margin  0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.10** -0.03 0.13* -0.21** 0.01 0.19** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) 
N  224 224 221 221 221 166 166 166 98 98 98 
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Definition 2a 
Year 0 1-3 4-6 >6 
Z-Cat. 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Av. Pr. No Aid - 0.63 0.37 0.12 0.53 0.35 0.23 0.44 0.33 0.40 0.29 0.31 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
Av. Pr. Aid - 0.70 0.30 0.10 0.50 0.40 0.15 0.40 0.45 0.26 0.28 0.46 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) 
Margin 
 
 0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.08* -0.04 0.12* -0.14* -0.01 0.15* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) 
N  224 224 221 221 221 158 158 158 88 88 88 
Definition 2b 
  Year 0 1-3 4-6 >6 
Z-Cat. 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Av. Pr. No Aid - 0.63 0.37 0.13 0.53 0.34 0.27 0.43 0.30 0.47 0.26 0.28 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Av. Pr.  Aid - 0.70 0.30 0.11 0.50 0.40 0.16 0.39 0.45 0.28 0.26 0.47 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
Margin 
 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.11** -0.05* 0.15** -0.19** 0.00 0.19** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10) (0.02) (0.09) 
N  224 224 221 221 221 161 161 161 94 94 94 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Bootstrapped standard errors in 
parentheses (1,000 repetitions). ‘Z-Cat.’ represents the categories market exit (Z-Cat.=1), red 
zone (Z-Cat.=2) according to Altman z-score category ‘firm with insufficient financial viability’ 
and save zone (Z-Cat.=3) encompassing the Altman-z-score categories ‘normal financial 
viability’ and ‘high financial viability’. ‘Year’ is the corresponding time period elapsed after the 
beginning of the restructuring measures. ‘Av. Pr. Aid’ and ‘Av. Pr. No Aid’, respectively, are the 
average probabilities of aid recipients and non-aid recipients to be in the corresponding category. 
Estimations applied to the dataset including the three nearest neighbors (NB=3). 
When looking at the Altman categories 1 (Z-Cat.) in Table 9 (‘firm has exited the 
market’), one infers that the probability of firm bankruptcy becomes significantly lower 
three years after the start of restructuring measures for firms that received restructuring 
aid. A unit change in the independent variable, i.e., aid received instead of no aid 
received, decreases the probability of a market exit by 21 percent in absolute terms 
(Altman cat. 1) after more than six years of restructuring while the difference is only 10 
percent in absolute terms in the period from three to six years after restructuring 
(column 2). There is no significant difference observed in the first three years after the 
start of a restructuring measure. Accordingly, there is evidence of a positive treatment 
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effect in terms of reducing the likelihood of market exit which starts after four years and 
then increases with the years elapsed since restructuring aid was granted. 
 This result therefore suggests that restructuring aid measures have a long-term rather 
than a short term impact on survival (conditional on a firm’s survival in the first years). 
Furthermore, the probability of a firm’s full recovery from financial distress – measured 
in categories of the Altman z-score – is also significantly higher for restructuring aid 
recipients in the long-term. Again referring to Table 9, we find a 19 percent higher 
probability for aid recipients to fully recover and reach the save zone six years after the 
restructuring aid was granted compared to the counterfactual, however, only a 13 
percent difference 4 to 6 years after the start year and no significant impact in the first 
3 years.18 
 Policy implications  4
Turning from the description of our empirical results to their policy implications, our 
main message is the following: state aid granted by the European Commission to firms 
in difficulty is effective in significantly increasing both the probability that these aided 
firms survive and that they return to a status of financial viability. In the light of the 
European Commission’s aim to only grant state aid in the case of a firm “… which, 
without outside intervention by the public authorities would almost certainly condemn 
it to go out of business in the short- or medium term” (Section 2.1, para. 9 of the 2004 
Guidelines), it can therefore be concluded that we find evidence consistent with the 
European Commission reaching this aim.  
 Our empirical results can further be put into perspective in light of earlier results 
reported in Glowicka (2006). Based on a data set of 86 R&R aid cases decided by the 
European Commission between 1995 and 2003, she finds that a significant fraction of the 
aid receiving firms eventually had to exit the market within the first four years despite 
receiving state aid. Thus, bailouts appear to have only delayed firm exit instead of 
18  The results from the ordered logit estimations are robust to the inclusion of covariates (i.e., age of the 
firm, dummy for public firms, GDP per capita, share of subsidies from government expenditures, three 
year unemployment rate). They are available from the authors upon request. Financial covariates were 
excluded because they are logically related to the dependent variable (as the Altman z-score is defined 
on the basis of a linear combination of financial covariates). Due to missing observations, we refrain 
from including the number of employees and, due to perfect prediction in some cases, firm size is also 
excluded. As the focus is on firm survival and financial viability (and the matching shows no mean 
difference for these variables), this does not bias our results. 
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preventing it. In this respect, our (partly) diverging results – using a more recent data 
set of 56 EC R&R aid cases decided between 2003 and 2012 – are consistent with the 
hypothesis that recent state aid reforms were successful in improving the evaluation 
process inside the European Commission leading to a better identification of those firms 
in difficulty – out of the entire group of applicants – that have an increased probability 
of survival (as, e.g., suggested by convincing restructuring plans). However, the fact that 
between 12 and 20 percent of the aided firms – according to our matching results – 
eventually still had to leave the market for good suggests that further incremental 
improvements in the effectiveness of the EC’s process of granting R&R aid are still 
possible.  
 In addition to these main policy conclusions, prior research by Chindooroy et al. 
(2007) and Nulsch (2014) also aim at identifying factors that significantly influence the 
survival probability of aided firms. Our estimates from a parametric survival model 
partly suggest that public firms have a significantly longer survival time than private 
firms.19 Furthermore, as part of our estimations of a semi-parametric survival model, we 
find limited evidence that very large firms have a lower failure risk. While the latter 
finding could be related to the well-known ‘too big to fail’ argument – suggesting that 
politicians have a strong incentive to bailout very large firms in fear of the severe social 
and economic consequences of their market exits – the former finding could reflect that 
public firms have better access to various financing sources leading to a significant 
increase in the survival probability.  
 In addition to these two main sets of results, two further policy-relevant implications 
can be drawn from our empirical analysis. First, our application of the matching 
procedure in combination with the four different definitions of survival reveals that aid 
receiving firms are less frequently acquired compared to non-aid receiving firms. This 
finding suggests that state aid is not consistently abused as windfall profit by firms who 
were planning to acquire the respective firm in difficulty anyway. Second, our empirical 
assessment of the financial viability of aided firms find that restructuring aid have a 
long-term rather than a short term impact on survival – conditional on a firm’s survival 
in the first years – implying that the granting of restructuring aid often reaches the 
desired long-term survival of firms in difficulty.  
19  However, the respective coefficient loses its significance when applying semi-parametric estimation 
methods. 
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 Thus, we can conclude that while we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
European Commission only grant restructuring aid conditional on “… a feasible and 
coherent and far-reaching plan to restore a firm’s long-term viability” (Section 2.2. para. 
17 of the 2004 Guidelines), we have to leave the question whether this aim was achieved 
by limiting “ … the amount and intensity of the aid … to the strict minimum of the 
restructuring costs necessary to enable restructuring to be undertaken …” (Section 3.2, 
para. 43 of the 2004 Guidelines) for future research. 
 Conclusion 5
In May 2012, the European Commission announced its State Aid Modernization (SAM) 
reform aiming at fostering growth in the internal market through streamlined rules and 
faster decisions. “State aid control should more effectively target sustainable growth-
enhancing policies while encouraging budgetary consolidation, limiting distortions of 
competition and keeping the single market open” (European Commission, 2012, p. 4). 
Interestingly, in working towards these goals, the Commission’s strategy does not only 
envisage the identification of common principles for assessing the compatibility of aid 
with the internal market – in combination with the creation or revision of guidelines and 
frameworks – but it explicitly includes an ex-post evaluation program as key tool to 
ensure an effective EU State aid policy (see European Commission, 2014).   
 From an academic perspective, the ex-post evaluation of state aid policies in general 
and rescue and restructuring (R&R) aid in particular can be subdivided further into two 
main research questions: First, from an effectiveness perspective, the question whether 
the granting of state aid had the desired direct effect suggests itself; i.e., in the case of 
R&R aid, did the granting of financial aid to firms in difficulty have a positive impact 
on their survival and financial viability? Second, from an efficiency perspective, the 
broader question is posed whether the respective state aid scheme or policy as such is 
socially desirable. In the case of R&R aid, such a broader assessment of social costs and 
benefits would have to go beyond the direct effects of the aid on the beneficiaries 
themselves (as well as their industries and sectors) and would additionally have to take 
various (positive or negative) indirect effects of the granting of aid on, e.g., competition, 
trade, employment, investment or economic growth into account.     
 In this paper, we concentrate on answers to the first research question by 
investigating whether 56 positive restructuring aid decisions – reached by the European 
Commission between 2003 and 2012 – had a measurable impact on the survival and 
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financial viability of the aided firms. Confronted with the challenge of a causal 
identification of the treatment effect of aided firms, we follow an empirical approach 
based on matching techniques. We first employ the matching on the whole population of 
firms in the AMADEUS database of European companies in order to identify non-aided 
– but otherwise comparable – firms which act as control group. Subsequently, we apply 
both survival models and ordered response models on the sample of aid receiving firms 
and the constructed counterfactual group to empirically investigate the impact of 
restructuring aid on firm survival and financial viability. Our estimates suggest that 
restructuring aid increases a firm’s average survival time by approximately 8 to 15 years 
or, putting it differently, decreases the exit rate by 58 percent to 68 percent. With 
respect to financial viability – measured by categories of the Altman z-scores – we find 
evidence that aid recipients not only have higher survival probabilities in the long-term 
but that they are also more likely to improve their financial viability compared to non-
aid receiving firms. 
 From a policy perspective, our empirical results directly support the conclusion that 
the European Commission’s R&R aid policy is effective in significantly increasing both 
the probability that firms in difficulty will survive as well as the probability that they 
return to a status of financial viability (in the long-term). Based on these findings on the 
effectiveness of R&R aid, the consequential next step – left for future research – is an 
ex-post evaluation of the efficiency of R&R aid. Although both data availability as well 
as methodological issues are expected to be substantial, a thorough and complete 
evaluation of state aid polices and schemes will have to provide the best possible 
answers to the ultimate question – namely whether such government policies are likely 
to generate positive or negative net total effects on social welfare.   
  
40 
References 
Agrawal, A. (2013), The Impact of Investor Protection Law on Corporate Policy and 
Performance: Evidence from the Blue Sky Laws, Journal of Financial Economics 107 (2), 417-
435. 
Allison, P. (2010), Survival Analysis, in: Hancock, G. and R. Mueller, The Reviewer’s Guide to 
Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences, New York, 413-425. 
Altman, E. (1968), Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate 
Bankruptcy, Journal of Finance 23, 589–609. 
Altman, E. (2002), Revisiting Credit Scoring Models in a Basel II Environment, Prepared for: 
Credit Rating: Methodologies, Rationale, and Default Risk, London Risk Books.  
Altman, E. and E. Hotchkiss (2006), Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy: Predict and 
Avoid Bankruptcy, Analyze and Invest in Distressed Debt, 3rd Edition. 
Angrist, J. and A. Krueger (2001), Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: 
From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(4), 
69-85. 
Bemmann, M. (2005), Verbesserung der Vergleichbarkeit von Schätzgüteergebnissen von 
Insolvenzprognosestudien, in: Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 08/2005, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=738648. 
Bronzini, R. and P. Piselli (2016), The Impact of R&D Subsidies on Firm Innovation, Research 
Policy 45 (2), 442–457. 
Caliendo, M. and S. Kopeinig (2008), Some Practical Guidance for the Implementation of 
Propensity Score Matching, Journal of Economic Surveys 22(1), 31-72.  
CERES (2005), The Impact of R&D State Aid and its Appraisal on the Level of EU Research 
Expenditures in the Context of the Barcelona European Council Objectives, Final Report, 
Athens. 
Chindooroy, R., P. Muller and G. Notaro (2007), Company Survival Following Rescue and 
Restructuring State Aid, European Journal of Law and Economics 24, 165–186. 
Cox, D. (1972), Regression Models and Life Tables, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 34, 
187-220. 
41 
Czarnitzki, D. and C. Lopes-Bento (2013), Value for Money? New Microeconometric Evidence 
on Public R&D Grants in Flanders, Research Policy 42, 76-89. 
Czarnitzki, D. and C. Lopes-Bento (2012), Evaluation of Public R&D Policies: A Cross-Country 
Comparison, World Review of Science, Technology and Sustainable Development 9 (2/3/4), 
254-282. 
Dimos, C. and G. Pugh (2016), The Effectiveness of R&D Subsidies: A Meta-Regression 
Analysis of the Evaluation Literature, Research Policy 45 (4), 797–815. 
European Commission (2015), Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the 
Document ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions’ on 
Competition Policy 2014, COM(2015) 247 final, Brussels. 
European Commission (2014), You Can’t Improve What You Can’t Measure: State Aid 
Evaluation, Competition Policy Brief, Issue 7, June 2014, Brussels. 
European Commission (2013), Evaluation in the Field of State Aid, Draft Methodological 
Guidance Paper – Concepts and Recommendations, November 2013, Brussels. 
European Commission (2012), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM(2012) 209 final, Brussels. 
European Commission (2005), State Aid Action Plan – Less and Better Targeted State Aid: A 
Roadmap for State Aid Reform 2005–2009, COM(2005) 107 final, Brussels. 
European Commission (2004), Guidelines on State Aid for Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in 
Difficulties, Official Journal of the European Union (2004/C 244/02), Brussels. 
Friederiszick, H., L.-H. Röller and V. Verouden (2007), European State Aid Control: An 
Economic Framework, in: P. Buccirossi (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, MIT Press, 
625-669. 
Greene, W. (2010), Testing Hypotheses about the Interaction Terms in Nonlinear Models, 
Economics Letters 107(2), 291-296. 
Glowicka, E. (2006), Effectiveness of Bailouts in the EU, GESY Discussion Paper No 176, 
available at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13375/1/176.pdf. 
Grice, J. and R. Ingram (2001), Tests of the Generalizability of Altman's Bankruptcy Prediction 
Model, Journal of Business Research 54(1), 53-61. 
42 
Holland, P. (1986), Statistics and Causal Inference, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 81, 945-970. 
Kassim, H. and B. Lyons (2013), The New Political Economy of EU State Aid Policy, Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade 13. 1-21. 
Lechner, M. (2001), Identification and Estimation of Causal Effects of Multiple Treatments 
under the Conditional Independence Assumption, in: M. Lechner and F. Pfeiffer (eds.), 
Econometric Evaluation of Labour Market Policies, 1-8.  
London Economics (2004), Ex-post Evaluation of the Impact of Rescue and Restructuring Aid 
on the International Competitiveness of the Sector(s) Affected by Such Aid, Final Report to 
the European Commission, Brussels. 
Morgan, S., and C. Winship (2007), Counterfactuals and Causal Inference. Methods and 
Principles for Social Research, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press. 
Morgan, S. and C. Winship (1999), The Estimation of Causal Effects From Observational Data, 
Annual Review of Sociology 25, 659-707. 
Nitsche, R. and P. Heidhues (2006), Study on Methods to Analyse the Impact of State Aid on 
Competition, Economic Papers, Number 244, Brussels. 
Nulsch, N. (2014), Is Subsidizing Companies in Difficulties an Optimal Policy? An Empirical 
Study on the Effectiveness of State Aid in the European Union, IWH-Diskussionspapiere, No. 
2014, 9. 
OECD (2010), Competition, State Aids and Subsidies, Policy Roundtables, DAF/COMP/ 
GF(2010)5, Paris. 
Oxera (2009), Should Aid be Granted to Firms in Difficulty? A Study on Counterfactual 
Scenarios to Restructuring State Aid, Prepared for the European Commission, Brussels. 
Ramboll & Matrix (2013), Ex-Post Evaluation of the Regional Aid Guidelines 2007-2013, Final 
Report, Luxembourg. 
Rubin, D. (1977),  Assignment  to  Treatment  Group  on  the  Basis  of  a 
Covariate, Journal  of Educational Statistics 2 (1), 1-26. 
Schweiger, H. (2011), The Impact of State Aid for Restructuring on the Allocation of Resources, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Working Paper No. 127. 
Sianesi, B. (2004), An Evaluation of the Swedish System of Active Labour Market Programmes 
in the 1990s, Review of Economics and Statistics 86(1), 133-155. 
43 
Tunali, Ç. and J. Fidrmuc (2015), State Aid Policy in the European Union, Journal of Common 
Market Studies 53 (5), 1143-1162. 
Zúñiga-Vicente J., C. Alonso-Borrego, F. Forcadell and J. Galan (2014), Assessing the Effect of 
Public Subsidies on Firm R&D Investment: A Survey, Journal of Economic Surveys 28(1), 
36-67.  
 
 
 
 
  
44 
Annex 
Table 10: Documentation of imputed data points in the group of treated 
firms 
Name of the firm Changes made 
Cyprus Airlines Copy employment, liquidity ratio, solvency ratio from 2005 to 2004 
Götzke 
Natursteinwerke 
Copy revenue, profit, EBIT from 2004 to 2007 and employm. from 
2008 to 2007 
Air Aland Copy employment from 2008 to 2010 
British Energy Copy all variables of interest from 2004 to 2003 
Macedonian 
Publishing Copy all variables of interest from 2008 to 2010 
Fluorite Copy all variables of interest from 2007 to 2006 
Air Malta Copy all variables of interest from 2011 to 2010 
Zaklad Naprawczy Copy non-current assets from 2010 to 2011 
Fabryka Samochobow Copy employment from 2003 to 2004 
Stocznia Gdansk Copy employment from 2004 to 2005 
Zaklady Miesne Copy employment from 2010 to 2011 
Fabryka Lozysk Copy employment from 2005 to 2009 
Konas Copy all variables of interest from 2005 to 2004 
Bull  Copy solvency ratio from 2003 to 2004 
Krakowskie Zaklady Copy solvency ratio from 2004 to 2007 
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Table 11: Matching protocol 
Step 1 Specify and estimate the probit model to obtain the 
propensity scores ?̂?𝑒(x). 
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all 
observations of treated firms with propensity scores larger 
than the maximum and smaller than the minimum of the 
propensity scores in the control group. 
Step 3 Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms 
and delete all other observations from that subsample. 
Step 4 Restrict the subsample of control firms to firms that have the 
same size (small, medium, large, very large) and operate in a 
similar industry (measured by the 2-digit NACE code) as the 
chosen treated firm. In addition, delete all observations that 
are not in the same year as the year in which the chosen 
treated firm received restructuring state aid. 
Step 5 Calculate the difference of the propensity scores between the 
chosen treated firm and the remaining control firms. 
Step 6 For NB=1: Select the observation with the minimum distance 
from the remaining control group. 
For NB=3: Select the three observations with the minimum 
distance from the remaining control group. 
Step 7 Repeat steps 3-6 for all treated firms. 
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Table 12: Probit estimation before matching 
 (1) (2) 
 Full Sample Without Polish Bus Operators 
Financial figures 
ln Profit -0.0295*** (0.0068) -0.0290*** (0.0069) 
ln Fixed Liabilities -0.0576*** (0.0189) -0.0475** (0.0198) 
ln Current Liabilities 0.0128 (0.0516) 0.0314 (0.0515) 
Revenue per Employee -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.0002 (0.0002) 
Altman Z-Score category -0.2368*** (0.0867) -0.2511*** (0.0916) 
Public Firm 0.2324** (0.1107) 0.2550** (0.1155) 
Liquidity ratio 0.0035 (0.0314) 0.0079 (0.0235) 
Solvency ratio -0.0092*** (0.0016) -0.0092*** (0.0016) 
Firm characteristics     
ln Employment 0.2878*** (0.0554) 0.2533*** (0.0553) 
ln Age -0.0118 (0.0502) -0.0355 (0.0507) 
Medium Firm 0.0805 (0.1715) 0.0084 (0.1732) 
Large Firm -0.0706 (0.1920) -0.0829 (0.1917) 
Very Large Firm -0.0632 (0.2566) -0.0974 (0.2581) 
Industry information     
NACE Industry Code 0 -0.0303 (0.4859) -0.0249 (0.4824) 
NACE Industry Code 1 -0.9418** (0.3698) -0.9177** (0.3681) 
NACE Industry Code 2 -0.8827** (0.3539) -0.8684** (0.3527) 
NACE Industry Code 3 -0.7224** (0.3638) -0.7128* (0.3629) 
NACE Industry Code 4 -0.8956** (0.3552) -1.0081*** (0.3602) 
NACE Industry Code 5 -0.7546** (0.3651) -0.7542** (0.3644) 
NACE Industry Code 6 -0.5962 (0.5096) -0.6237 (0.5104) 
NACE Industry Code 7 -0.6800* (0.3717) -0.6906* (0.3707) 
Country information     
Belgium -0.9548** (0.3766) -0.9893*** (0.3739) 
Cyprus 0.1383 (0.7630) 0.1410 (0.7623) 
Czech Republic -1.0654*** (0.4001) -1.0598*** (0.3982) 
Germany -1.3527*** (0.4437) -1.3969*** (0.4444) 
Denmark -0.5638 (0.7137) -0.5923 (0.7150) 
Spain -1.1296*** (0.3799) -1.2017*** (0.3797) 
Finland -0.8810** (0.4223) -0.9195 (0.4224) 
France -1.3984*** (0.3980) -1.4465*** (0.3967) 
UK -1.5745*** (0.4191) -1.5881*** (0.4188) 
Greece -0.7936* (0.4565) -0.8620* (0.4559) 
Italy -1.1410*** (0.3401) -1.2121*** (0.3386) 
Malta 0.5994 (0.8888) 0.5226 (0.8843) 
Poland -0.1504 (0.3483) -0.2564 (0.3512) 
Slovenia 0.5666 (0.4799) 0.5368 (0.4784) 
Slovakia -0.8110* (0.4598) -0.8920* (0.4607) 
Macro level information     
Unemployment level last 3 years -0.0503*** (0.0173) -0.0383** (0.0175) 
Share of subsidies from gov. expend. (%) -0.0077 (0.0120) -0.0081 (0.0120) 
GDP per capita 0.0426** (0.0201) 0.0434** (0.0204) 
Intercept -1.5939 (1.0030) -1.5812 (1.0028) 
McFadden R2 0.386 
479.06 
0.00 
1,132,417 
0.382 
433.59 
0.00 
1,132,413 
LR χ2 
p> χ2 
#Observations 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 13: Probit estimation after matching 
                           (1) (2) 
                            N=1 N=3 
Financial figures 
ln Profit -0.0204 (0.0212) -0.0104 (0.0165) 
ln Fixed Liabilities 0.0527 (0.0709) -0.0476 (0.0534) 
ln Current Liabilities 0.0212 (0.222) 0.0701 (0.142) 
Revenue per Employee -0.000432 (0.00109) -0.000168 (0.000682) 
Altman Z-Score category 0.0185 (0.385) -0.300 (0.221) 
Public Firm -0.172 (0.455) -0.137 (0.321) 
Liquidity ratio 0.703** (0.339) 0.0382 (0.0643) 
Solvency ratio -0.0155** (0.00661) -0.0113** (0.00448) 
Firm characteristics     
ln Employment 0.102 (0.208) 0.206 (0.149) 
ln Age 0.119 (0.174) -0.102 (0.127) 
Medium Firm 1.064 (1.002) -0.747 (0.563) 
Large Firm 0.909 (1.093) -0.631 (0.628) 
Very Large Firm 0.476 (1.288) -0.779 (0.788) 
Industry information     
NACE Industry Code 0 0.135 (1.800) -0.187 (1.306) 
NACE Industry Code 1 -0.577 (1.316) -1.327 (1.026) 
NACE Industry Code 2 -0.553 (1.204) -1.202 (0.957) 
NACE Industry Code 3 -0.114 (1.190) -0.608 (0.943) 
NACE Industry Code 4 -0.457 (1.246) -1.161 (0.970) 
NACE Industry Code 5 -0.809 (1.191) -1.186 (0.960) 
NACE Industry Code 6 0.135 (1.800) -0.187 (1.306) 
NACE Industry Code 7 -0.577 (1.316) -1.327 (1.026) 
Country information     
Belgium -4.668 (742.7) -4.746 (233.6) 
Cyprus 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Czech Republic -4.944 (742.7) -5.812 (233.6) 
Germany 0 (.) -5.387 (233.6) 
Denmark 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Spain -5.341 (742.7) -5.669 (233.6) 
Finland 0 (.) -5.867 (233.6) 
France -6.638 (742.7) -7.239 (233.6) 
UK -6.539 (742.7) -7.443 (233.6) 
Greece -5.510 (742.7) -6.167 (233.6) 
Italy -5.975 (742.7) -6.594 (233.6) 
Malta 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Poland 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Slovenia -4.306 (742.7) -4.815 (233.6) 
Slovakia 0 (.) 0 (.) 
Macro level information     
Unemployment level last 3 years -0.0706 (0.0658) -0.0909* (0.0498) 
Share of subsidies from gov. expend. (%) -0.0473 (0.113) -0.0728 (0.0828) 
GDP per capita -0.00487 (0.0880) 0.0865 (0.0634) 
Intercept 6.830 (742.7) 11.64 (233.7) 
McFadden R2 0.17  0.16  
LR χ2 24.42  38.24  
p> χ2 0.83  0.28  
#Observations 105  217  
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.   
48 
Table 14: Mean difference tests before matching with unequal variances 
Variables Aid receiving firms, 
N=57 
 Non-aid receiving 
firms,  
N=1,132,360 
 Results of t-tests 
on mean 
difference 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D.   
Financial Figures        
ln Profit -3.8104 7.2691  2.0825 4.3054  *** 
ln Fixed liabilities 7.6584 4.1073  5.0288 2.6484  *** 
ln Current liabilities 9.9896 2.7099  6.8662 1.9918  *** 
Revenue per employee 155.0788 216.9677  532.5130 21760.775  *** 
Altman Z-Score category 1.3509 0.5822  2.0916 0.7455  *** 
Public firm 0.6667 0.4756  0.2847 0.4513  *** 
Liquidity ratio 0.6708 0.6469  1.5428 3.2522  *** 
Solvency ratio 7.9504 37.9917  33.3579 25.0619  *** 
Firm Characteristics        
ln Employment 6.1066 1.7635  2.6816 1.5603  *** 
ln Age 3.0551 1.1371  2.6719 0.7853  ** 
Medium firm 0.2982 0.4616  0.3967 0.4892  - 
Large firm 0.2807 0.4533  0.1639 0.3702  * 
Very large firm 0.3509 0.4815  0.0429 0.2027  *** 
Macro level Information        
Unemploy. level last 3 years 9.5842 4.2290  10.7737 4.3288  ** 
Share of subs. from gov. exp. 62.2212 11.6203  66.7845 9.7499  *** 
GDP per capita 2.1772 2.4827  0.4537 2.4405  *** 
Outcome        
Status 2014 Def. 1a (1=act.) 0.8246 0.3837  0.8304 0.3753  - 
Status 2014 Def. 2a (1=act.) 0.8772 0.3311  0.8555 0.3516  - 
Status 2014 Def. 1b (1=act.) 0.8070 0.3981  0.8143 0.3889  - 
Status 2014 Def. 2b (1=act.) 0.8596 0.3504  0.8393 0.3672  - 
Notes: Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. H0: means are equal for both groups.  
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Table 15: Information criteria for parametric models fitted with different 
distributions (NB=3)  
Without 
covariates in 
addition to aid 
 Exponential Log Logistic Log Norm. Weibull Gompertz 
AIC Def. 1a 305.16 284.53 281.29 285.58 291.74 
Def. 2a 275.56 265.71 262.50 266.54 271.59 
 Def. 1b 306.83 289.79 286.39 290.43 296.70 
 Def. 2b 273.37 262.21 259.22 262.92 268.06 
       
BIC Def. 1a 357.84 342.47 339.23 343.53 349.69 
Def. 2a 280.84 276.28 273.07 277.12 282.16 
Def. 1b 312.08 300.28 296.88 300.92 307.19 
Def. 2b 278.63 272.73 269.75 273.44 278.56 
 
With additional 
covariates 
 
Exponential Log Logistic Log Normal Weibull Gompertz 
AIC Def. 1a 309.54 294.33 290.65 295.22 301.47 
Def. 2a 272.02 258.75 255.00 260.36 265.48 
 Def. 1b 302.35 279.69 276.69 280.44 286.22 
 Def. 2b 269.46 254.52 250.97 256.02 261.03 
       
BIC Def. 1a 314.81 304.87 301.18 305.76 312.01 
Def. 2a 324.87 316.88 313.13 318.50 323.61 
Def. 1b 354.78 337.36 334.36 338.11 343.89 
Def. 2b 322.07 312.39 308.84 313.89 318.89 
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 Figure 3:  Parametric survival curves (NB=3) 
Table 16: Mean value of Altman z-scores per year, Def. 1(), NB=1 
Time     Number of firms from 𝑁𝑁  Number of firms from 𝐴𝐴 
Cat. Year 𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� p-val. 
in  𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� died acq miss total  in  𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� died acq miss total 
1 0 1.39 1.36 0.7609 56 0 0 0 56  56 0 0 0 56 
                 1 1.42 1.36 0.6297 50 5 0 1 56  50 0 0 6 56 
2 2 1.57 1.47 0.4758 46 7 1 2 56  49 1 0 6 56 
 3 1.45 1.48 0.8644 40 7 2 4 53  42 3 0 8 53 
                 4 1.48 1.47 0.9450 31 8 2 2 43  36 4 0 3 43 
3 5 1.46 1.63 0.3910 26 9 2 1 38  32 3 0 3 38 
 6 1.58 1.63 0.8579 19 9 2 1 31  24 2 0 5 31 
                 7 1.47 1.70 0.3809 15 9 2 0 26  20 4 0 2 26 
4 8 1.57 1.58 0.9752 7 9 1 3 20  12 2 0 6 20 
9 1.60 2.14 0.3287 5 8 2 1 16  7 3 0 6 16 
 10 2.00 2.38 . 1 9 2 1 13  8 2 0 3 13 
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Table 17: Mean value of Altman z-scores per year, Def. 2(), NB=1 
Time     Number of firms from 𝑁𝑁  Number of firms from 𝐴𝐴 
Cat Year 𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� p-val in  𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� died acq miss total  in  𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� died acq miss total 
1 0 1.39 1.36 0.7609 56 0 0 0 56  56 0 0 0 56 
                 1 1.42 1.36 0.6297 50 5 0 1 56  50 0 0 6 56 
2 2 1.57 1.47 0.4758 46 6 1 3 56  49 1 0 6 56 
 3 1.45 1.48 0.8644 40 6 2 5 53  42 1 0 10 53 
                 4 1.48 1.47 0.9450 31 7 2 3 43  36 2 0 5 43 
3 5 1.46 1.63 0.3910 26 8 2 2 38  32 1 0 5 38 
 6 1.58 1.63 0.8579 19 8 2 2 31  24 1 0 6 31 
                 7 1.47 1.70 0.3809 15 9 2 0 26  20 3 0 3 26 
4 8 1.57 1.58 0.9752 7 9 1 3 20  12 1 0 7 20 
9 1.60 2.14 0.3287 5 8 2 1 16  7 2 0 7 16 
 10 2.00 2.38 . 1 7 2 3 13  8 2 0 3 13 
 
Table 18: Mean value of Altman z-scores per year, Def. 2(), NB=3 
Time     Number of firms from 𝑁𝑁  Number of firms from 𝐴𝐴 
Cat Year 𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� p-val. 
in  𝑍𝑍𝑁𝑁���� died acq miss Total  in  𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴��� died acq miss total 
1 0 1.49 1.36 0.1544 168 0 0 0 168  56 0 0 0 56 
                
 1 1.52 1.36 0.1254 154 11 0 3 168  50 0 0 6 56 
2 2 1.59 1.47 0.2561 143 17 1 7 168  49 1 0 6 56 
 3 1.62 1.48 0.2682 116 22 2 19 159  42 1 0 10 53 
                 4 1.68 1.47 0.1395 94 24 3 8 129  36 2 0 5 43 
3 5 1.65 1.63 0.8836 77 24 5 8 114  32 1 0 5 38 
 6 1.51 1.63 0.5580 51 27 5 10 93  24 1 0 6 31 
                 7 1.67 1.70 0.8774 39 24 6 9 78  20 3 0 3 26 
4 8 1.75 1.58 0.5692 20 23 5 12 60  12 1 0 7 20 
9 1.83 2.14 0.4721 12 21 5 10 48  7 2 0 7 16 
 10 2.20 2.38 0.6550 5 18 5 11 39  8 2 0 3 13 
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